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Abstract 
 
Domestic courts are often confronted with circumstances in which their interpretation of municipal 
legislation which purports to implement an international treaty differs significantly from that of other 
jurisdictions that have implemented that same treaty. States parties often come to realise these differences 
when they are called upon to cooperate in facilitating the execution of the relevant treaty. This is clearly 
undesirable as it defeats the purpose of treaty negotiation which is to attain consistency in approach 
amongst states parties.   
 
This dissertation proposes a solution to that problem. It is based on the hypothesis that uniformity in the 
drafting techniques used to implement different types of international treaties will eliminate, or at least 
reduce, the incidence of domestic legislation‟s deviating from the true intentions of the treaty it proposes to 
implement. The dissertation tests this hypothesis by examining the approach taken by different jurisdictions 
in implementing selected treaties. The study reveals that there is merit to the hypothesis. However, there are 
several factors which determine which drafting technique will best implement the terms of a treaty in a 
particular jurisdiction. Therefore, the same implementation technique may not be suitable for all 
contracting states.  What is required is a structured approach to treaty implementation. This comes with an 
appreciation of the factors that will indicate and should be used to determine which drafting technique is 
the most suitable.  
 
By way of solution to the problem posed, a guide is formulated. It provides a set of best practices for treaty 
implementation.   
 
 
Word length 
 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 34 600 words. 
 
 
Subjects and Topics 
Legislative drafting, Implementation techniques 
International treaties, Domestic legislation. 
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I Introduction  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine whether a particular legislative drafting 
technique
1
 - for example the formula method, the wording method or the subordination 
method - can always be identified as the most appropriate one to be used to implement a 
specific treaty.
 
 
 
This paper uses examples of the implementation of three different types of treaties to test 
this. Poorly drafted implementing legislation results in an inaccurate representation of 
treaty terms in domestic law. This problem manifests itself in different ways. One is in 
the distortion of the meaning of treaty terms and another is in a divergence in the extent 
of implementation of a particular treaty by contracting states. The examples are also used 
to illustrate how these problems may arise.  
 
The first example is the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction
2
 for which the formula method would seem to be the most appropriate 
technique for implementation. The Hague Convention is used to demonstrate how the 
meaning of treaty terms may be altered in one contracting state where its legislature 
selects an inappropriate implementing technique.  
 
The second example is the Charter of the United Nations
3
 for which the wording method 
and the subordination method appear to be the most appropriate techniques for 
implementation. The examination of the implementation of the Charter in different 
jurisdictions reveals that whilst a prohibition on reservations suggests that all 
implementing states would fully implement all treaty terms, other factors might influence 
the legislature to craft implementing legislation such that treaty terms are incorporated 
only to the extent to which it is desired that the treaty has some bearing on domestic law.  
 
The third example is the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.
4
 
                                               
1  A list of the different drafting techniques that can be used is set out in Part II C. 
2  Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (opened for signature 25 
              October 1980, entered into force 1 December 1983)[Hague Convention]. 
3  Charter of the United Nations (opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October, 
 1945) [Charter].   
4 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and  
 Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (opened for signature 14 November 1970, entered into  
 force 24 April 1972).[UNESCO Convention]. 
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This example illustrates how the use of different implementation techniques by 
contracting states can affect the extent of the implementation of a treaty in each state. The 
UNESCO Convention also shows the difficulties in anticipating the assignment of the 
same implementation technique to all contracting states. It illustrates how factors such as 
the existing legislative framework in each state and the lodging of reservations influence 
the implementation technique that is selected.  
 
With each example, the dissertation demonstrates how to evaluate treaty provisions and 
use the results of that evaluation to determine the implementation technique. However, it 
is recognised that there are internal factors that should also be taken into account and 
those internal factors also influence the selection of a particular implementation 
technique. Circumstances may vary in each contracting state. Thus, the study reveals that 
the goal should not necessarily be for uniformity in implementation technique, but for 
uniformity in the construction of treaty terms in domestic law. It answers the question of 
how this uniformity can be achieved by formulating a guide. The guide outlines a step- 
by-step proposal as to the approach drafters should take.  
 
This dissertation does not merely bring structure to the selection of an appropriate 
implementation technique. It goes a step further by identifying the stylistic features which 
should be used in drafting to signify the intention to implement a treaty. The guide can 
serve as a tool which drafters may consult to implement treaties in a manner which is 
cost-effective, efficient and ultimately demonstrates the good faith mandated by art 26 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
5
  
 
                                               
5  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force  
 7 January 1980). 
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Man is not confined by the State, but lives his life within the community of mankind, 
and if international law for the most part deals with the corporate activities of the 
State as a primary form of human organisation, it still aims at harmonising human 
relationships.
1
 
 
  
II Pacta sunt servanda2 
A The nature of treaties 
 
The world consists of states with different cultural backgrounds and languages. However, 
other states cannot be ignored as their actions affect lifestyles across the globe. Some of 
the most significant areas which call for a collaborative approach include environmental 
protection, security, trade and transport. This has become even more apparent with 
technological and scientific advancement.  Shaw elucidates this point when he states: 3 
 
In reality, with the phenomenal growth in communications and consciousness, and 
with the constant reminder of global rivalries, not even the most powerful of states 
can be entirely sovereign. Interdependence and the close-knit character of 
contemporary international commercial and political society ensures that virtually 
any action of a state could well have profound repercussions upon the system as a 
whole and the decisions under consideration by other states.  
 
This raises the question of how states harmonise their relationships
4
 given their vast 
differences and fondness for state sovereignty.  Shaw answers this question by drawing a 
comparison with the process by which human beings set rules to govern their own 
relations and impose penalties to ensure that these rules are enforced. He advises: “[a]nd 
so it is with what is termed international law, with the important difference that the 
principal subjects of international law are nation states, not individual citizens.”5  
 
International law constitutes the legal machinery by which states regulate their 
international relations. By virtue of art 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the International Court of 
                                               
1  D P O‟Connell International Law (2nd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1970) at 3.  
2  “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith.” 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 
7 January 1980), art 26.[Vienna Convention] 
3  Malcolm N Shaw International Law (6th ed, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008) at 129.  
4  See O‟Connell, above n 1. 
5  Shaw, above n 3, at 1. 
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Justice, international conventions constitute one of the factors that the International Court 
of Justice must have regard to when determining questions of international law. Shaw and 
O‟Brien indicate that the term international convention is but one of many used to 
describe an international treaty.
6
  Perhaps the most authoritative definition of a treaty is 
set out at art 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention which provides that for the purposes of 
that Convention:
7
 
 
“treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation; … 
 
Shaw explains that in times past, legal relations amongst states were governed largely by 
accepted behavioural patterns which developed into custom. He adds that the opinio juris 
or conviction of the binding nature of the agreements gave credence to the significance of 
customary practices to the extent that they evolved into customary international law. 
Shaw maintains that as states became more sophisticated in their practices, much of the 
uncertainty as to the terms of their agreements was removed by the emergence of the 
treaty, the distinguishing factor being that the terms of these customary arrangements 
were reduced into writing.
8
  
 
Sinclair describes the Vienna Convention as: “… a major work of codification and 
progressive development …”.9  Shaw affirms that it constitutes “the basic framework for 
any discussion of the nature and characteristics of treaties.”10 The Vienna Convention 
covers a number of key principles which regulate the operation of treaties. These include 
the capacity of states to be bound by treaties, full powers, consent to be bound by treaties, 
reservations, withdrawal and the invalidity of a treaty.
11
  Shaw highlights the significance 
of art 2(1)(a) as he states: “the binding nature of treaties is founded upon the customary 
international law principle that agreements are binding (pacta sunt servanda).”12 
 
                                               
6  See Shaw, above n 3, at 88; John O‟Brien International Law (Cavendish Publishing Ltd, London, 
2001) at 80. 
7  See the Vienna Convention, above n 2, at art 2(1)(a). 
8  Shaw, above, n 3, at 72-93. 
9
  M Sinclair “Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties” (1970) 19 ICLQ 47 at 47. 
10  Shaw above n 3, at 903. 
11  See the Vienna Convention, above n 2, arts 6,7,11,19, 54 and 65 respectively. 
12  Shaw, above n 3, at 94. 
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Villiger describes pacta sunt servanda as: “the cornerstone of international relations.”13 
He advises that it “lies at the heart of the Convention” and “applies without exception to 
every treaty including its annexes and appendices”.14 (footnotes omitted). The pacta sunt 
servanda rule prescribes that on entering any treaty arrangement the parties are expected 
to use their best endeavours to comply with treaty obligations. It is contended that a state 
demonstrates the intention to do so by the manner in which that state gives effect to the 
treaty in domestic law. This is reflected in the legislative drafting technique used and the 
content and structure of implementing legislation. It is therefore argued that in order to 
achieve the goal of capturing the true meaning of a treaty, the legislature ought to give 
careful consideration to the suitability of the implementation technique that is used.  The 
constitutional basis upon which a treaty is implemented in the domestic law of a state 
depends on whether it is a monist or dualist state.   
B  The status of treaties in domestic law: Distinction between monism and dualism 
 
(a) Monism  
 
Aust describes monism as a characteristic of the constitution of a state which allows for a 
treaty to have the force of law within that state upon ratification and without the need for 
further implementing legislation.
15
 He explains that such a treaty is referred to as a self- 
executing treaty. Aust advises that not all treaties are self-executing as further legislation 
may be required to give them the force of law even in a monist state.
16
 He adds that 
although there may be variations, the three common features of monist states are:
 17
 
 
(1) the treaties usually require parliamentary approval; 
(2) the treaties are categorised according to whether they are self-executing or not; 
and  
(3) there may be instances where a self-executing treaty overrides conflicting national 
legislation or vice versa. 
 
                                               
13  Mark E Villiger Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2009) at 363 and 365 respectively. 
14  Villiger, above n 13. Emphasis in the original. 
15
  Anthony Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2
nd
 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007) at 183. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid. 
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Monism appears to almost conveniently divorce the willingness to comply with treaty 
obligations from the process that enables compliance. For this reason, this dissertation 
does not investigate treaty implementation in monist states. Instead, it focuses on treaty 
implementation in dualist states, where decisive measures must be taken before treaty 
terms can have the any effect in domestic law.  
 
       (b) Dualism 
 
In contrast to the monist approach, it is only where the dualist state takes the necessary 
legislative steps to impose international law rules on the domestic legislative order, that 
such international law rules will have legal effect internally.
18
 This principle was 
reinforced by Lord Diplock as follows:
19
 
 
Where by a treaty Her Majesty‟s Government undertakes either to introduce 
domestic legislation to achieve a specified result in the United Kingdom or to secure 
a specified result which can only be achieved by legislation, the treaty, since in 
English law it is not self-operating, remains irrelevant to any issue in the English 
courts until Her Majesty‟s Government has taken steps by way of legislation to fulfil 
its treaty obligations. Once the government has legislated, which it may do in 
anticipation of the coming into effect of the treaty … the court must in the first 
instance construe the legislation, for that is what the court has to apply.  
 
O‟Connell used the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy to explain that where a dualist 
state enacts legislation that is inconsistent with international law, this does not render the 
domestic legislation invalid.
20
 Instead, it means that the sovereign is in violation of its 
international obligations.
21
 Lord Diplock captured the interaction between parliamentary 
supremacy and the observance of the pacta sunt servanda rule when he warned:
22
 
 
If the terms of the legislation are clear and unambiguous, they must be given effect 
to whether or not they carry out Her Majesty‟s treaty obligations, for the sovereign 
power of the Queen in Parliament extends to breaking treaties (see Ellerman Lines 
Ltd v Murray [1931] AC 126), and any remedy for such a breach of an international 
obligation lies in a forum other than Her Majesty‟s own courts.  
                                               
18  See Aust, above n 15, at 150. 
19  Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1966] 3 All ER 871(CA) at [875] per Diplock  
LJ.  
20  O‟Connell, above n 1, at 42. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise, above n 19, at [875] per Diplock LJ. 
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The above indicates that the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy gives a dualist state the 
power to determine its internal laws even to the extent that it overlooks treaty obligations.   
That notwithstanding, the pacta sunt servanda rule presupposes that having expressed an 
intention to be bound through ratification, the dualist state will not deliberately legislate 
in a manner that would contravene its treaty obligations.  
 
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention can be described as reinforcing the pacta sunt 
servanda rule. It provides:
23
  
 
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty. 
 
Villiger suggests that: “[t]o hold otherwise would result in a state being able to free itself 
of its treaty obligations by its own unilateral legislative action”.24  
 
The Law Commission of New Zealand made special mention of this in its report of May 
1996
25
 and recommended that governments put the necessary measures in place to ensure 
that their internal laws adequately complement their treaty obligations.
26
The Law 
Commission highlighted the safeguards used in New Zealand by indicating that where a 
government minister puts a new legislative proposal to the Cabinet Legislation 
Committee, he must establish that the proposal is in compliance with New Zealand‟s 
treaty obligations.
27
 This requirement is clearly set out in New Zealand‟s Cabinet Office 
Manual.
28
 The Law Commission pointed out that another safeguard used in New Zealand 
is the requirement to check draft legislation against the Bill of Rights Act 1990.
29
 This 
presents another opportunity to examine the extent of compliance with treaty obligations, 
as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 has a role in the implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
30
 The Law Commission further 
recommended that “appropriate and timely consultation during the process of developing 
                                               
23  Vienna Convention, above n 2, at art 27. 
24  Villiger, above n 13, at 372. 
25  Law Commission A New Zealand Guide to International Law and its Sources (NZLCPP34, 1996) 
at para 5.[Law Commission]. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid. 
28
  Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at para 7.60. 
29  The Law Commission, above n 25, at para 5. 
30  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
              force 23 March 1976). 
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legislation is therefore important to ensure that international obligations are not being 
overlooked or breached”.31  
 
In light of the above, it is contended that the pacta sunt servanda rule is observed, or good 
faith is manifested, by choosing sound legislative practices which support the effective 
implementation of treaty terms in domestic law. Therefore, this process ought to be 
approached purposefully in a dualist state. The legislative drafting techniques which may 
be used for that purpose are set out below. 
 
C  The legislative drafting techniques used to implement treaties 
 
Academics and legislative drafters have identified a range of legislative drafting 
techniques which may be used to implement treaties in domestic law.
32
 The main 
techniques are: 
 
(1) Direct implementation or the formula method; 
(2) The wording method; 
(3) The subordination method; 
(4) Reliance on pre-existing legislation; 
(5) The amendment of several pieces of legislation; 
(6) Scheduling the text of a treaty and referring to all or part of it in the body of the 
legislation; 
(7) Enacting anticipatory legislation;  
(8) Enacting non-legislative powers; 
(9) Legislation may contain no reference to the treaty being implemented.   
 
Mendis rightly advises that the list is not exhaustive and that there is a need for further 
classification given the legislative practices in Commonwealth countries.
33
 Each 
                                               
31  The Law Commission, above n 25, at para 5. 
32  See generally GC Thornton Legislative Drafting (4th ed Tottel Publishing, West Sussex, 2005) at 
              310; DL Mendis “The Legislative Transformation of Treaties” (1992) 13(3) Stat LR 216 at 221- 
223; The Law Commission, above n 25, at para 45; Armand De Mestral and Evan Fox-Decent 
“Implementation and Reception: The Congeniality of Canada‟s Legal Order to International Law” 
in Oonagh E Fitzgerald (ed) The Globalised Rule of Law: Relationships between International 
and Domestic Law (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2006) at 45-55; John Mark Keyes and Ruth Sullivan “A 
Legislative Perspective on the Interaction of International and Domestic Law” in Oonagh E 
Fitzerald (ed) The Globalised Rule of Law: Relationships between International and Domestic 
Law (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2006) at 310. 
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technique has its advantages and disadvantages. Also, a combination of techniques may 
be used to implement the same treaty. It is argued that to achieve uniformity, drafters 
must be able to discern which method will best transpose treaty terms into their 
respective domestic legislative orders. This paper seeks to highlight the consequences of 
the failure to appreciate this. Part III presents the implementation of the Hague 
Convention in New Zealand as an illustration. 
                                               
33  See Mendis, above n 32, at 222. 
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III  What is worth rewording is worth rewording well – An analysis of the 
implementation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction in New Zealand  
 
The wording method presents a drafter with the freedom to rewrite treaty provisions into 
domestic law. It allows a drafter to reconstruct the words and phrases of a treaty and the 
general structure of the treaty itself. It is agreed that there are instances where it is best to 
transcribe treaty provisions into local parlance. However, it is also suggested that where a 
decision is taken to reword treaty provisions, no effort should be spared in ensuring that 
the meaning and effect of the treaty is not distorted in the process. The reformulation of 
treaty provisions in domestic legislation should be approached with caution, bearing in 
mind that domestic legislation may not be invoked as justification for non-compliance 
with treaty terms.
1
 This fosters adherence to the pacta sunt servanda rule, as it 
demonstrates a commitment to capture treaty terms in domestic law accurately. 
 
This paper examines whether there are any indicators within a treaty or factors relating to 
the legislative scheme already in place within a particular jurisdiction, which could assist 
drafters in determining whether the wording method is the most appropriate technique to 
be used. Thornton advises that the wording method permits the use of language that 
complements legislative drafting practices that are specific to a particular jurisdiction.
2
 
He emphasises that “[t]he effects of loose language and construction in the Convention 
can be ameliorated [and existing] laws and practices can be accommodated more 
smoothly”. 3  The Legislation Advisory Committee indicates that treaties are often 
expressed in general language for the purposes of reaching an agreement and therefore 
made the following recommendation:
4
  
 
Some treaties are designed to be incorporated directly into domestic legislation. The 
majority are not, and can contain references that are not normally used in New 
Zealand legislation. Care should be taken, however, in deciding whether or not to 
replace such references with the more familiar domestic ones, as this may alter the 
meaning and affect New Zealand‟s compliance with the relevant international rule.  
 
                                               
1  See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered 
 into force 7 January 1980), art 27. [Vienna Convention].   
2
  GC Thornton Legislative Drafting (4
th
 ed, Tottel Publishing, West Sussex, 2005). 
3  Ibid, at 309.     
4  Legislation Advisory Committee “Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process & 
              Content of Legislation” (2001) Ministry of Justice 6.2.1 <www.justice.govt.nz >.  
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These sentiments were echoed by Thornton who warned: “[t]he modern trend is to follow 
the direct approach in the absence of good reason not to … [if] the contents of the 
Convention are capable of effective application in this way, the direct approach should be 
favoured”. 5 The Legislation Advisory Committee states quite cogently:6  
 
[i]f a treaty amounts to a self-contained body that does not require any operational 
machinery to support it, the „force of law‟ formula method can be used to implement 
the treaty. If a treaty requires operational machinery to support it or its terms require 
some form of translation to be effective, the wording method should be used. 
 
Thus, the learning on this matter suggests that a treaty that is not worth rewording should 
be left as is. In light of the above, the implementation of the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
7
 in New Zealand is of interest. The Hague 
Convention was implemented in New Zealand‟s municipal law by the wording method. 
This is at variance with the approach taken in other jurisdictions such as the United 
Kingdom and most provinces in Canada, which used the formula method to implement it. 
 
Thornton proposes that “[t]he test of whether the domestic law accords with the 
Convention comes when the domestic law is interpreted in the domestic courts.”8 It is 
interesting that the New Zealand legislature has been criticised for its approach by its 
own judiciary and that of other jurisdictions. That notwithstanding, some have come to its 
defence.
9
 It is submitted that in this case, the New Zealand legislature was wrong. Not 
only was a poor choice made in terms of the legislative drafting technique used, but 
further, it was not executed well. This manifests itself repeatedly as judicial 
pronouncements on the matter indicate that the provisions of the Hague Convention have 
a different meaning in New Zealand‟s domestic law than they do in other contracting 
states. 
 
This Part highlights the level of inconsistency in state practice that results when 
parliament, consciously or otherwise, alters the meaning of treaty provisions during the 
process of implementation. It also assesses the strength of arguments proffered in support 
of the use of the wording method for the purposes of implementing the Hague 
                                               
5  Thornton, above n 2, at 309 and 310. 
6  Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 4, at para 6.23. 
7
  Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (opened for signature 
 25 October 1980, entered into force 1 December 1983)[Hague Convention]. 
8  Thornton, above n 2, at 309. 
9  See Margaret Nixon “Legislation and the Hague Convention” [2007] NZLJ 91. 
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Convention in New Zealand. The recommendation is that not only must the wording 
method be recognised as the most appropriate technique to implement a particular treaty, 
but where it is selected, it should be well executed.  
A  The purpose of the Hague Convention and the meaning of its terms 
 
In order to determine which implementation technique is the most appropriate for the 
implementation of a treaty, a drafter must first evaluate the terms of that treaty. In that 
regard, Professor Elisa Pérez-Vera sets out the background to the Hague Convention in 
the explanatory report of 1982.
10
 As she explains, child abductors often assume that the 
act of removing a child to another jurisdiction will be viewed more favourably in law by 
the competent authorities in the jurisdiction they have moved to, than the one that the 
child was taken from.
11
 Professor Pérez-Vera advises that in view of this, the Hague 
Convention seeks to deprive child abductors of the perceived legal benefits of their 
actions by restoring the status quo. This is achieved by mandating the “prompt return of 
children wrongfully removed from or retained in any Contracting State”.12 Thus, the 
objectives of the Hague Convention were set out in art 1 as follows:13 
 
The objects of the present Convention are – 
 
(a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in 
any Contracting State; and 
(b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one 
Contracting State are effectively respected in other Contracting States. 
 
Article 1(a) suggests that the prompt return of children will only be required where it is 
established that such children have been wrongfully removed to or retained in a 
contracting state. However, art 1(b) suggests another, more general purpose. In this 
regard, the Hague Convention also appears to serve as a guard keeping watch over 
custody and access rights to ensure that they are respected in other contracting states. It is 
submitted that upon further reading of the terms of the Hague Convention, the distinction 
                                               
10  Elisa Pérez-Vera, “Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention” (1982) 
              Hague Conference on Private International Law < www.hcch.net >. 
11  Ibid, at para16. 
12  Ibid. 
13  The Hague Convention, above n 7, at art 1. 
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between its two separate purposes becomes less clear. This view finds support in the 
explanatory report which provides:
14
 
 
The Convention reflects on the whole a compromise between two concepts, different 
in part, concerning the end to be achieved. In fact one can see in the preliminary 
proceedings a potential conflict between the desire to protect factual situations 
altered by the wrongful removal or retention of a child, and that of guaranteeing, in 
particular, respect for the legal relationships which may underlie such situations. The 
Convention has struck a rather delicate balance in this regard. 
 
The meaning of the term “wrongful removal” is relevant to the task of determining the 
kind of action that will prompt the return of a child under the Hague Convention. Article 
3 provides:
15
 
 
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where – 
 
(a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any 
other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the 
child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; 
and 
(b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, 
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal 
or retention.  
 
Therefore, the ambit of the term “wrongful removal” is limited to the breach of custody 
rights as opposed to access rights. The explanatory report indicates that the Hague 
Convention was careful to define the terms “rights of custody” and “rights of access” 
because its objectives would be compromised by a misinterpretation of their respective 
meanings.
16
  
 
It is therefore vital that a drafter who purports to implement the Hague Convention by the 
wording method has a firm grasp of the difference in the meaning of each of the terms, 
the definitions of which are set out in art 5 of the Hague Convention as follows:
17
 
 
 
                                               
14
  Pérez-Vera, above n 10, at para 9. 
15  The Hague Convention, above n 7, at art 3. 
16  Pérez-Vera, above n 10, at para 83. 
17  The Hague Convention, above n 7, at art 5. 
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For the purposes of this Convention – 
 
(a) “rights of custody” shall include rights relating to the care of the person of 
the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child‟s place of 
residence; 
(b) “rights of access” shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of 
time to a place other than the child‟s habitual residence. 
 
With regard to the definition of the term “rights of custody,” the explanatory report 
indicates that the Hague Convention “merely emphasises the fact that it includes in the 
term, „rights relating to the care of the person of the child,‟ leaving aside the possible 
ways of protecting the child‟s property.”18 However, the explanatory report also confirms 
that “the Convention seeks to be more precise by emphasising as an example of the „care‟ 
referred to, the right to determine the child‟s place of residence.” 19  It would seem 
therefore, that under the Hague Convention, a holder of custody rights is identified as one 
who not only cares for a child, but ultimately, has the right to decide where that child is to 
live.     
 
The Hague Convention assists contracting states by providing a definition for the terms 
“rights of custody” and “rights of access.” If a contracting state wishes to implement and 
therefore align its internal laws with the Hague Convention, the meaning of the terms 
“custody rights” and “access rights” should not depart from that set out under it. This is 
because it is only a person who has the right to determine a child‟s place of residence and 
has exercised that right prior to the child‟s removal, who can cite wrongful removal as the 
basis for that child‟s return pursuant to the Convention. This position is affirmed in the 
explanatory report which provides: “[t]he duty to return a child arises only if its removal 
or retention is considered wrongful in terms of the Convention.”20 
 
It is expected that an explanatory report would clarify any perceived ambiguities in a 
Convention. However, it is submitted that this explanatory report does very little in terms 
of clarifying the reference to respect for custody and access rights in art 1(b).  Instead, it 
seems to concede the point that the Convention does not adequately define its objectives. 
Professor Pérez-Vera simply states:
21
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  Pérez-Vera, above n 10, at para 84. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Pérez-Vera, above n 10, at para 64. 
21  Ibid, at para 17. 
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Now, since the Convention does not specify the means to be employed by each State 
in bringing about respect for rights of custody which exist in another Contracting 
State, one must conclude that, with the exception of the indirect means of protecting 
custody rights which is implied by the obligation to return the child to the holder of 
the right of custody, respect for custody rights falls almost entirely outwith the scope 
of the Convention. On the other hand, rights of access form the subject of a rule 
which, although undoubtedly incomplete, nevertheless is indicative of the interest 
shown in ensuring regular contact between parents and children, even when custody 
has been entrusted to one of the parents or to a third party. 
 
It is contended that art 1(a) is sufficient to imply that respect for a person‟s custody rights 
forms the basis for the composition of the Hague Convention. Therefore, phrasing art 
1(b) as is, serves no further purpose than to reduce the level of clarity in the drafting of 
the Convention. If, as is suggested in the explanatory report, respect for custody rights is 
outside of the scope of the Convention, it submitted that it should not have been expressly 
stated as an objective in art 1(b). Perhaps reference could have been made to the fact that 
its scope was limited to the extent provided for in art 1(a).  Further, if the rule in art 1(b) 
is undoubtedly incomplete, then it should not have remained as drafted, because a drafter 
who is unable to grasp the very subtle intricacies in the drafting of the Hague Convention 
may carry that confusion to the implementing legislation.    
 
It is contended that the clarity in the drafting of the Hague Convention becomes even 
more clouded at art 4 which provides:
22
 
 
The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a 
Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The 
Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.  
 
It can be argued that art 4 suggests that a breach of either custody or access rights can 
trigger action under the Hague Convention. This is correct. However, art 4 falls short of 
stating precisely what kind of action either breach would generate. It is submitted that the 
drafters of the Hague Convention could have been more direct by specifying that the 
breach of access rights referred to under art 4 and elsewhere in the Convention
23
 is 
incapable of bringing about the return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in a 
contracting state. The explanatory report does not address this potential anomaly resulting 
from drafting of art 4. It merely states that art 4 relates to the scope of the Hague 
                                               
22  The Hague Convention, above n 7, at art 4. 
23  See for example, the Hague Convention, above n 7, at art 29. 
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Convention in terms of the class of children that are protected.
 24
 The focus is then 
diverted to a discussion on identifying the category of persons described as protected 
children and the category of persons who can have custody and access rights.
25
 That 
notwithstanding, the breach of access rights referred to in art 4 appears to be relevant to 
art 1(b) to the extent that these rights should be respected and as such, they would be 
protected under the Convention. It is submitted that matters such as these ought to have 
been dealt with more carefully in the Hague Convention to facilitate its smooth 
implementation in domestic law.  
 
Despite the observations regarding the level of assistance given by the explanatory report, 
it does confirm that the Hague Convention has two objectives, one remedial insofar as it 
facilitates the return of children wrongfully removed from their habitual place of 
residence and the other preventative, insofar as it advocates respect for rights of custody 
and access exercised in contracting states.
26
 These two distinct elements must be captured 
in the provisions of domestic legislation without overlapping. The question therefore is 
which drafting technique will best implement the Hague Convention given the suggested 
inadequacies in its drafting. Is such a Convention worth rewording? Alternatively, are 
there factors within a particular jurisdiction requiring that it be reworded?  It remains to 
be seen how various jurisdictions approached this matter. An examination of New 
Zealand‟s approach will reveal that the difficulty arises where the two objectives of the 
Convention appear to overlap when reformulated in domestic legislation. 
B  Incorporation by New Zealand 
 
The Hague Convention was first incorporated in New Zealand by the wording method. 
This was facilitated by the Guardianship Amendment Act 1991
27
 which amended the 
Guardianship Act 1968. The text of the Hague Convention was annexed in the Schedule 
to the Act and the very important term “rights of custody” was defined as follows:28 
 
For the purposes of this part of this Act, a person has rights of custody in respect of a 
child if, under the law of the contracting State in which the child was, immediately 
before his or her removal, habitually resident, that person has, either alone or jointly 
with any other person or persons, 
                                               
24  Pérez-Vera, above n 10, at para 58. 
25
  Ibid, at paras 75–79. 
26  Pérez-Vera, above n 10, at para 35. 
27  Guardianship Amendment Act 1991 [the Act]. Now repealed. 
28  Guardianship Amendment Act 1991, s 4. 
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(a) the right to the possession and care of the child, and 
(b) to the extent permitted by the right referred to in paragraph (a) of this 
subsection, the right to determine where the child is to live.  
 
Since then, the legislature has made several amendments to the statute book in an effort 
to strengthen the incorporation of the Hague Convention in New Zealand‟s domestic law. 
These amendments are discussed below in detail. The legislative instrument which now 
incorporates the Convention is the Care of Children Act 2004. In an article of 2007 Nixon 
proffered several reasons to support the approach taken by New Zealand under the 
Guardianship Amendment Act 1991.
29
 This paper finds little support for Nixon‟s 
reasoning. Her arguments are set out below to facilitate a critical review of the same.  
 
With regard to the choice of the wording method, Nixon argues that “the Convention 
itself produced the conflict of opinion, but the first s 4 did try to avert it.”30 She then 
suggests that the Select Committee considered a proposal to use the formula method but 
was satisfied that amongst other things, the use of the wording method would help “deal 
promptly with applications made under the Convention.”31 Nixon appears to justify her 
support for the Select Committee‟s reasoning when she adds: 32  
 
[t]he committee acknowledged that lawyers, judges and officials would be helped to 
deal with applications expeditiously if the legislation were in a form with which they 
were familiar; if interpretation questions apparent on the face of the Convention 
were resolved in the legislation; and if the provisions of the Convention were 
arranged in a manner that assisted understanding of them. 
 
She also suggests that in order to assist the reader, the provisions setting out the grounds 
for the court refusing to order the return of a child are arranged in one clause in the Act, 
as opposed to several articles, in the Convention.
33
Another argument raised by Nixon is 
that if international precedent is unavailable or irrelevant, it will not assist in the 
interpretation of a treaty implemented by the formula method.
34
 Nixon also claims that 
family lawyers in New Zealand must have been satisfied with the approach taken by the 
legislature since they did not take issue with it and claims that “the Care of Children Act 
                                               
29  See Nixon, above n 9. 
30  Ibid, at 93. 
31
  Ibid. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
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2004 re-enacts the Guardianship Amendment Act 1991, in nearly identical language, in ss 
95 to 124”.35 
 
In relation to the language of the Act, not only does Nixon insist that s 4(1) captured the 
intentions of the Hague Convention, she maintains that it “was expressed as it was to 
capture the Convention‟s intention not to enforce the access rights and guardianship 
rights of non-custodial parents”.36 Nixon therefore suggests that the framers of s 4(1) 
believed that the meaning of terms of the Hague Convention remained intact, despite s 
4(1) being worded as it was. In other words, it was considered that the pacta sunt 
servanda rule was being observed.  Nixon further adds that this formulation “did not treat 
the right to determine the child‟s place of residence as an access right or guardianship 
right”.37  To support her argument, she refers to the Minister of Justice‟s speech at the 
second reading of the Guardianship Amendment Bill.
38
 To further buttress her argument 
Nixon cites the judgment of the District Court in the case of Gross v Boda 
39
 where the 
court held that s 4(1) of the Act prevented the applicant from enforcing access rights.  
 
It is submitted that much of Nixon‟s reasoning is flawed and produces a very weak 
argument. As regards the use of the wording method, it has been suggested in this paper 
that the Hague Convention is probably not the best example of elegant treaty drafting.  
Nixon indicates that the wording method was used to avert the problems caused as a 
result. The difficulty with that argument is that the legislature must never purport to 
correct ambiguities in a treaty by writing what ought to be in that treaty into domestic 
legislation. There is a very thin line between elaborating on general terms within a treaty 
to bring clarity to treaty provisions in domestic legislation and altering treaty terms. By 
framing her argument as she did, Nixon is effectively admitting that this line may have 
been crossed. Thornton has emphasised that “[w]here the purpose of domestic legislation 
is to implement an obligation under an international agreement, the role of the legislature 
is restricted, in a practical, if not in a legal sense, to that of a law-transformer rather than a 
law-giver.” 40  It is therefore submitted that it is incorrect to suggest that possible 
ambiguities in the Convention would have been dealt with in that way. It is further 
                                               
35  Ibid. 
36  Nixon, above n 9, at 91. 
37
  Ibid. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Gross v Boda [1994] NZFLR 704. 
40  Thornton, above n 2, at 309. 
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submitted that it would have been best not to tamper with the provisions of the Hague 
Convention given its tendency towards ambiguity.  
 
Nixon indicates that she agrees with the approach taken by the Select Committee.
41
 
Whilst her assertions are correct, there appears to be a disconnection which makes the 
argument seem forced. It is agreed that lawyers will be assisted if treaty provisions are 
reworded using language with which they are familiar. It is also agreed that the 
rearrangement of treaty provisions may assist in their understanding when incorporated 
into domestic law. However, these factors are relevant to treaty implementation in any 
dualist state. It is submitted that Nixon‟s argument would have been stronger had she 
outlined exactly what specific features of New Zealand‟s existing legislation supported 
the use of the wording method in this instance.  
 
It is further submitted that the proposal that the wording method would facilitate the 
prompt dealing with applications made pursuant to the Hague Convention is a weak 
argument. The expeditious handling of cases is desirable. However, delay is a matter that 
is largely within the purview of the local courts, and there are many other factors which 
directly affect and therefore cause it. It can be argued that the courts would be assisted in 
handling cases expeditiously if they have a better understanding of the implementing 
legislation, but arguing the use of the wording method on the point of delay is 
unconvincing.  
 
Nixon‟s reasoning can be strongly challenged on the point of the actual wording that was 
used in the Act and whether it properly captured the terms of the Hague Convention. In 
contrast to Nixon‟s support for the Select Committee‟s approach, the Legislation 
Advisory Committee advised against the use of the wording method because the 
proposed Bill contained different words from that used in the Hague Convention, but that 
advice was not taken.
 42
 The Legislation Advisory Committee feared that the court would 
have deduced from these differences an intention to deliberately part from the wording of 
the Convention.
43
 The Legislation Advisory Committee reported that New Zealand courts 
did find these differences to be “significant.”44 This is the kind of issue that ought to have 
exercised the mind of the Select Committee when deciding on the most suitable drafting 
                                               
41  See Nixon, above n 9, at 93. 
42
  See the Legislation Advisory Committee, “Report of the Legislation Advisory Committee: 1 
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43  Ibid. 
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technique to use to implement the Convention. The Legislation Advisory Committee‟s 
standpoint is supported. It is agreed that the wording used in the Act did not enhance the 
understanding of provisions of the Hague Convention. Instead, it seemed to have altered 
the meaning of terms such as “rights of custody.”   
 
It is submitted that Nixon‟s supposition that had the formula method been used, the 
unavailability of international jurisprudence on the subject would hamper the 
interpretation of the implementing legislation lacks logic. First, international 
jurisprudence addressing interpretation questions on the Hague Convention did exist prior 
to the enactment of the Guardianship Amendment Act 1991.
45
 Secondly, further 
international jurisprudence would have evolved and did evolve over time.
46
  Thirdly, a 
dearth of international jurisprudence is insufficient to substantiate the exclusion of the 
wording method where more pertinent factors support its use. In Hunter v Murrow
47
 the 
Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom noted that the Convention had been implemented 
by the formula method in other jurisdictions and gave the example of the United 
Kingdom in 1985. This predated the enactment of New Zealand‟s implementing 
legislation by over five years. Further, the judgment of the House of Lords in Fothergill v 
Monarch Airlines Ltd
48
 delivered ten years prior to the enactment of the Act, is clear 
authority that the courts may refer to travaux préparatoires to resolve ambiguities in 
legislation implemented using the formula method and that a purposive approach should 
be taken.
49
 
 
It appears that Nixon presupposes that interpretation questions would be raised, when the 
primary goal should always be to enact implementing legislation that properly represents 
treaty terms and therefore in itself raises no interpretation questions. It is therefore 
submitted that electing the formula method may have been the more prudent means of 
managing any ambiguities in the Hague Convention. To do otherwise, is to run the risk of 
binding the courts to the will of parliament, notwithstanding its disharmony with the 
Convention. An analysis of the comments from the judiciary in New Zealand illustrates 
that this is precisely what happened in New Zealand.  
                                               
45  See for example Re J(A Minor)(Abduction: Custody Rights)[1990] 2 All ER 961 (HL), on the 
distinction between “rights of custody” and “rights of access”.   
46  See for example Thomson v Thomson [1994] 3 SCR 551(SCC), a Canadian authority, and 
              Hunter v Murrow [2005] EWCA Civ 976 (CA), 3 FRC 1, an English authority. 
47  Hunter v Murrow, above n 46. 
48  Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 696 (HL). 
49  Ibid; see also Re H (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1991] 3 All ER 230 (HL). 
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C  Criticism by New Zealand’s judiciary  
 
Under s 4(1)(a) of the Act, a person with custody rights had the right to possession and 
care of a child. It is contended that a person with access rights as defined under s 2 of the 
Act also had the right to possession and care of a child. The wording of s 4(1)(b) was “to 
the extent permitted by the right referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection, the right 
to determine where the child is to live.” This is slightly different from the Hague 
Convention which states “and in particular.” It suggests that if in the exercise of rights to 
possession a person is, by chance, allowed to determine where the child lives, then that 
person has custody rights too. Thus, it can be argued that “custody rights” and “access 
rights” overlapped under the Act. There is a wealth of judicial authority supporting this 
view including Gross v Boda,
50
 the very case upon which Nixon relies.
51
 Nixon alluded 
to the final judgment in Gross v Boda.
52
 However, the examination of the reasoning 
which preceded that court‟s final determination reveals that even the District Court 
criticised the manner in which the Hague Convention was incorporated in New Zealand. 
 
In this regard, Whitehead J appreciated that the drafters of the Convention aimed to bring 
precision to the definition of “rights of custody” by indicating that a person who had 
custody rights had the right to care for a child to the extent that he could determine where 
that child was to live. This can be deduced from Whitehead J‟s statement: “[t]here is a 
special emphasis on the right to determine the child‟s place of residence above any other 
right including the right to the care of the person of the child.”53 It is also notable that 
although Judge Whitehead was able to identify arts 1, 3 and 5 of the Hague Convention 
as the articles which were relevant to establishing whether an applicant had rights of 
custody,
54
 he reasoned that the definition of “rights of custody” in s 4(1) of the Act 
constituted a combination of “parts of arts 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention.”55 It may be 
recalled from the brief discussion above, that art 4 of the Hague Convention appears to 
cloud the clarity in the Hague Convention and that that possibility is not considered in the 
explanatory report. However, Whitehead J observed that there are elements of art 4 of the 
Convention in s 4(1) of the Act.  
 
                                               
50  Gross v Boda, above n 39. 
51  See Nixon, above n 9, at 91. 
52
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54  Ibid. 
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Whitehead J demonstrated that he was fully aware of the need for implementing 
legislation to be in line with the Convention it purports to implement when he referred to 
the learning in Burrows and Carter‟s Statute Law New Zealand.56  He noted that Burrows 
and Carter explained that the factor setting implementing legislation apart from other 
legislation is that it is governed by a treaty which is an international document that may 
have been implemented in other jurisdictions.
57
 Whitehead J also noted Burrows and 
Carter‟s advice that courts should be mindful of the desire to maintain uniformity in 
interpretation throughout contracting states.
58
 He cited Lord Diplock‟s reference to 
Ellerman Lines Limited v Murray
59
 in Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise 
60
 and reasoned that:
61
 
 
As the New Zealand Act is specifically clear in respect of its definition of rights of 
custody, it would appear that the decision of Ellerman Lines Limited v Murray … 
would still apply. The net result of this is that the desirability of international 
uniformity in such cases must be eroded by the New Zealand definition of rights of 
custody and as a result New Zealand may stand on its own in that regard. 
 
This indicates that even Whitehead J deduced that as formulated, s 4(1) of the Act did not 
reflect the intentions of the Hague Convention. Thus, his reasoning does not support 
Nixon‟s position.62  
 
The New Zealand legislature got a further scolding from its judiciary when Gross v Boda 
was heard on appeal. It was there that the court pointed out the defect in the draft 
composed by the legislature. As Hardie Boys J lamented:
63
 
 
The issue in this Court has been as to the meaning of s 4(1) which enacts, but in a 
more extended form and with one particular difference, art 5 of the Convention. The 
difference is that while the Convention defines rights of custody in a single formula, 
the statute has a twofold cumulative formula. 
                                               
56  Gross v Boda, above n 39, at [710] per Judge Whitehead; JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in 
New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009). 
57  See Gross v Boda, above n 39, at [710] per Judge Whitehead . 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ellerman Lines Limited v Murray [1931] AC 126 (CA). 
60  Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1966] 3 All ER 871(CA). 
61  Gross v Boda, above n 39, at [710] per Judge Whitehead . 
62
  It is curious that despite his reasoning, Judge Whitehead  was somehow unable to find that this 
              incorrect formulation of “rights of custody” in New Zealand‟s internal law also included “rights of 
 access.” See Gross v Boda, above n 39. 
63  Gross v Boda [1995] NZFLR 49 (CA) at [53] per Hardie Boys J. 
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Cooke P observed that that construction of s 4(1) could result in an overlapping of the 
definitions of “rights of access” and “rights of custody.” As he stated:64 
 
… those definitions are not mutually exclusive. A right of intermittent possession 
and care of a child will fall within s 4(1)(a) and to that extent will fall within the 
definition of rights of custody also. No doubt it may also fall within the definition of 
rights of access so there is a possibility of overlap. 
 
McKay J also recognised that New Zealand had parted company with other jurisdictions 
which had implemented the Convention. He commented:
65
 
 
It is unfortunate that for reasons which are not readily discernible the Act has 
departed from the wording of the Convention, instead of simply adopting it as has 
apparently been done in other countries. Some of the differences appear to be 
significant.  
 
The above indicates that the New Zealand judiciary was well aware of the weaknesses in 
the drafting of the Act. Thus, contrary to Nixon‟s assessment of the matter, this was not a 
question of the New Zealand courts misinterpreting well-drafted legislation.  The courts 
were bound to conform to the will of parliament and did so regrettably, because the 
domestic legislation was clear and unambiguous. An examination of the approach taken 
by the judiciary in the United Kingdom reveals that they too appreciated the dilemma 
faced by the New Zealand judiciary.  
D Incorporation in the United Kingdom and its criticism of New Zealand’s approach  
 
In contrast to the implementation technique used in New Zealand, the Hague Convention 
was implemented in the United Kingdom by the formula method. Nixon suggested that 
the formula method was not an appropriate implementation technique for implementation 
in New Zealand, because if international precedent is unavailable that might hamper the 
interpretation of the Convention.
66
 She proposed that despite criticism by the English 
judiciary, the New Zealand legislature was not to be blamed.
67
 In view of Nixon‟s 
comments, the purpose of the analysis of the English case law below is twofold. First, it 
underlines the procedure by which the courts go about answering interpretation questions 
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  At [56] per Cooke P.  
65  At [51] per McKay J. 
66  Nixon, above n 9, at 93. 
67  Ibid.  
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on Convention terms where the formula method is used. Secondly, it highlights 
pronouncements from the English judiciary which indicate that it in fact sympathised 
with New Zealand‟s judiciary having recognised that despite the defects in the 
implementing legislation, New Zealand‟s judiciary was obliged to succumb to the will of 
its parliament.  
 
By using the formula method, the English legislature imported the exact wording used in 
the Hague Convention into its legislative scheme. This was achieved through the 
enactment of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985(UK). The Hague Convention 
was set out in sch 1 to that Act and was given the force of law under s 1(2). Other 
provisions of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985(UK) provided for the 
operational machinery. Section 3 provided for the central authority who is the Lord 
Chancellor, s 4 judicial authorities, s 5 the courts‟ interim powers and s 6 reports.  
 
Therefore, when the English courts are called upon to determine matters relevant to the 
Hague Convention, they have regard to the wording used in the Hague Convention itself, 
as opposed to a reconstruction of it composed by the legislature.  The phrase “rights of 
custody” is construed as set out in art 5 of the Hague Convention, which is appended in 
schedule 1 of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985(UK).
68
  Murphy indicates that 
the term “rights of custody” under the Hague Convention is akin to the English concept 
of parental responsibility.
69
 He explains that this is consistent with “rights relating to the 
care of the person of the child and in particular, the right to determine the child‟s place of 
residence: Hague Convention Art 5.”70 This was the approach taken by the English court 
in S v H (Abduction: Access Rights) 
71
 where it was held that the parent who was left 
behind and whose consent was not required to have the child removed from the 
jurisdiction, did not have parental authority and therefore did not have custody rights 
under the Convention.
72
  
 
 
 
                                               
68  See the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 (UK), sch 1. 
69  John Murphy International dimensions in Family Law (Manchester University Press, UK, 2005) at 
 214.          
70  Ibid. 
71  S v H (Abduction: Access Rights)[1998] Fam 49 (Family Division). 
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The English practice
73
 has been to maintain a distinction between “rights of custody” and 
“rights of access.” Murphy was careful to warn that “the correlation between custody 
rights and parental responsibility should not be supposed to be an exact one.”74 A similar 
line was taken in the case of Re V-B (minors)(abduction: rights of custody)
75
 in which the 
court also maintained a distinction between “rights of custody” and “rights of access,” 
and recognised that in order to determine whether a parent had either of these rights, the 
first step was to determine what rights the requesting parent held under the domestic law 
in which the child was habitually resident. The second step was to determine whether 
these rights amounted to rights of custody under the Convention as a matter of law within 
the jurisdiction in which the Convention is invoked. The third step was to determine 
whether those rights had been breached by the removal of the child.
76
 In so doing, the 
court was guided by the advice of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Re H 
(minors)(abduction: acquiescence): 
77
 
 
An international Convention, expressed in different languages and intended to apply 
to a wide range of differing legal systems, cannot be construed differently in 
different jurisdictions. The Convention must have the same meaning and effect 
under the laws of all contracting states. I would therefore reject any construction of 
Article 13 which reflects purely English law rules as to the meaning of the word 
acquiescence. I would also deplore attempts to introduce special rules of law 
applicable in England alone … which are not to be found in the Convention itself or 
in the general law of all developed nations. 
 
The court determined that this was in keeping with the second conclusion of the Report of 
the Second Special Commission meeting to review the operation of the Hague 
Convention in January 1993.  Ward J reproduced this excerpt from the report:
78
 
 
The key concepts which determine the scope of the Convention are not dependent 
for their meaning on any single legal system. Thus the expression “rights of 
custody,” for example does not coincide with any particular concept of custody in 
                                               
73  See Re W(a minor)(unmarried father), Re B(a minor)(unmarried father)[1999] Fam 1(CA); 
              Hunter v Murrow, above n 46;  Re V-B (minors)(abduction: rights of custody )[1999] 2 FCR 
 371(CA); Re D (a child)(abduction: foreign custody rights)[2007] 1 All ER 783 (HL).  
74  See Murphy, above n 69. 
75
  Re V-B (minors)(abduction: rights of custody), above n 73. 
76  Ibid, at 375– 376 per Ward LJ. 
77  Re H (minors)(abduction: acquiescence)[1998] AC 72 (HL) at [87] per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.  
78  See Re V-B (minors)(abduction: rights of custody) above n 73, at 375 per Ward J. 
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domestic law, but draws its meaning from the definitions, structure and purposes of 
the Convention. 
 
The court therefore considered the purpose of the Hague Convention and referred to its  
preamble for guidance. Lord Browne-Wilkinson‟s exposition of the approach to be taken 
provides a direct response to Nixon‟s comment on the interpretation of Convention terms 
when implemented by the formula method. As he explained, the definitions, structure and 
purpose of the relevant Convention should be considered and a purposive, general 
construction of its terms is to be assumed. This is the approach which ought to have been 
taken by New Zealand courts had the formula method been used. 
 
In addition to the above, the explanatory material relevant to the Hague Convention 
should also be considered to address interpretation questions where the formula method is 
used. In Re D(a child)(abduction: foreign custody rights)
79
 the House of Lords referred to 
art 5 of the Hague Convention to determine the meaning of the words “rights of custody” 
and “rights of access” and also consulted the explanatory report by Professor Pérez-Vera 
as a guide. The court determined that the explanatory report confirmed that there was a 
deliberate distinction between “rights of custody” and “rights of access” under the 
Convention. 
80
 It was also affirmed in that case that contracting states should aim for 
uniformity in the interpretation of Conventions which have been implemented in 
domestic law.
81
 Upon assessing the approach taken in many other jurisdictions, the House 
of Lords noted that New Zealand had to be separated from the others since it had “gone 
still further and held that rights of access can in themselves amount to rights of 
custody.”82  
 
In her commentary, Nixon referred to Hunter v Murrow
83
 as an example of English 
authority in which the New Zealand legislature‟s approach was criticised, but she 
maintained that the New Zealand statute was not to be blamed.
84
 A closer examination of 
the judgment in that case reveals that the English court appreciated that the New Zealand 
courts were bound to accede to the will of their parliament, when its intentions were 
presented in clear and unambiguous terms. The distinguishing factor in Hunter v Murrow 
was that the English court also recognised that it was not bound by the New Zealand 
                                               
79  Re D (a child)(abduction: foreign custody rights), above n 73. 
80  At [25], per Baroness Hale. 
81
  At [28], per Baroness Hale. 
82  At [35], per Baroness Hale. 
83  Hunter v Murrow, above n 46. 
84  Nixon, above n 9, at 93. 
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court‟s ruling on a Hague Convention question, where such a question had been referred 
pursuant to an application made under the English court‟s inherent jurisdiction.85 
 
Thorpe LJ investigated the basis upon which the New Zealand court determined that the 
removal of the child in the instant case was wrongful pursuant to art 3 of the Convention. 
In furtherance of his objective, Thorpe LJ referred to New Zealand‟s implementing 
legislation and asserted:
86
 
 
In incorporating the Convention many jurisdictions have taken the same path as this 
jurisdiction, the path of more or less wholesale incorporation. Thus, the majority of 
the Convention is simply a schedule to our 1985 statute. However, other jurisdictions 
have preferred to achieve the effect of incorporation by independent legislative 
provisions. New Zealand has followed that latter course. Thus it was through the 
Guardianship Amendment Act 1991 that the Hague Convention was implemented … 
Thus the decision of the Family Court determining whether or not the removal of 
Xavier had been wrongful required the application to the agreed facts of section 4 of 
the Act rather than Articles 3 and 5. The desirable goal of a uniform construction of 
the Convention amongst all the Contracting States may obviously be impeded by the 
preference of some States to embark on a redrafting exercise in the process of 
implementation. 
 
Thorpe LJ‟s analysis of the New Zealand judiciary‟s approach was so thorough that he 
located and proffered evidence of the New Zealand judiciary‟s discomfort with the 
legislative drafting technique preferred by its legislature.  In so doing, he noted that 
English authority as to the distinction between the terms “rights of custody” and “rights 
of access” had been put to the High Court in New Zealand. However, the judge in that 
case found himself bound by the precedent set by New Zealand Court of Appeal.  Thus, 
Thorpe LJ recited the reasoning of the judge in New Zealand‟s High Court as follows:87 
 
… the fact remains that the (New Zealand) Court of Appeal has fashioned an 
approach in this country which may well be different to that in other jurisdictions, 
but which is nonetheless binding on both the Family Court and this court.  
  
                                               
85  Hunter v Murrow, above n 46, at [47] per Dyson LJ.  
86  Ibid, at 15-18 per Thorpe LJ. 
87  Hunter v Murrow, above n 46, at [21] per Thorpe LJ. 
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This refutes Nixon‟s claim that the blame should not rest with New Zealand‟s legislature. 
It underscores the principle handed down in the Salomon
88
 case that where the 
sovereign‟s intentions are clearly stated in implementing legislation, the courts have no 
jurisdiction to remedy an apparent breach of international obligations.
89
  
E  New Zealand’s first attempt to rectify a blunder? The Guardianship Amendment 
Act (No 2) 1994 
 
The Legislation Advisory Committee strongly advocated that drafters be careful to 
compose implementing legislation that accurately captures New Zealand‟s international 
obligations from the outset, because of the strain on resources that results from attempts 
to rectify poorly drafted legislation.
90
 It further predicted that “[i]f New Zealand is in 
breach, the government of the day will have to use some of its precious parliamentary 
resources to revisit and amend the non-compliant legislation;” 91  and so they did in 
relation to s 4 of the Act.  
 
The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill (No 3) 1994 was introduced in 
parliament in 1994. Insofar as it contained amendments to the Act, the explanatory note 
to the Bill provided that the new s 4 which repealed s 4 of the Act would be “modelled 
more closely than the existing section on Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction”. 92  The Legislation Advisory Committee 
expressed strong criticism of this move not only because it was indicative of the wastage 
of resources which could have been avoided, but because it took the view that not even 
that attempt at rewording s 4(1) of the Act was done well. As stated in its report of 
1996:
93
 
 
The Explanatory Note to the Bill stated that the new section 4 „is modelled more 
closely than the existing section on Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction‟ … As clause 39 of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill (No. 3) 1994 recognised, the law had to be put right. 
However to quote the Explanatory Note, the new section 4 was still only to be 
                                               
88  Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise, above n 60. 
89  At [875] per Diplock LJ.  
90
  Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 4, at para 6.1.2. 
91  Ibid. 
92  Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill (No 3) 1994 (38-1) (explanatory note) at v. 
93  Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 42, at Part III. 
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„modelled more closely‟ on the wording of the Convention-it did not directly invoke 
the wording of the Convention.  
 
The Legislation Advisory Committee seems to have aired its frustrations because it had 
already determined and advised five years before, that there was no reason New Zealand 
could not have emulated the approach taken by the United Kingdom, Canada and the 
United States and used the formula method. Even further, the Legislation Advisory 
Committee considered that the wording used in the amendment still allowed for the 
courts to interpret in a manner that was inconsistent with the Hague Convention.
94
 
Section 39(1) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 3) 1994 was 
worded as follows: 
 
The Guardianship Amendment Act 1991 is hereby amended by repealing section 4, 
and substituting the following: 
 
For the purposes of this Part of this Act, the term „rights of custody,‟ in relation to a 
child, shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child, and in 
particular, the right to determine the child‟s place of residence, attributed to a person, 
institution or other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the Contracting 
State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or 
retention of the child. 
 
This later became the Guardianship Amendment Act (No 2) 1994. It appears that the 
above is worded more closely to s 3 and 5 of the Convention than the previous s 4.
95
 
Nixon suggested that: “[t]he second s 4 was not needed.” 96 In a later article she wrote:97  
 
Unfortunately, the original section 4 was replaced in 1994 as part of the 
Guardianship Amendment Act (No 2) 1994. A vital message disappeared from the 
law. New Zealand Courts were no longer told that the Article 5(a) right to determine 
the child‟s place of residence was not the guardianship right, but rather, an aspect of 
the custody right. Fairfax illustrates the problem that the removal of the message 
caused. 
 
                                               
94  Ibid. 
95
  See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions Bill (No 3) 1994 (38-1) (explanatory note), above 
               n 92, at v. 
96  Nixon, above 9 at 92. 
97  Margaret Nixon “Hague Convention Hares-time for the gamekeeper?”[2009] NZ Lawyer 22 at 23. 
34 Blame the drafter or the treaty? Towards uniformity in the implementation of treaties in domestic law. 
 
 
It is submitted first that the explanatory note to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Bill (No 3) 1994 proves that it was parliament‟s intention to correct the 
earlier error by effecting that amendment. Secondly, Nixon‟s comments confirm that the 
framers of s 4 of the Act overstepped their boundaries as law transformers by attempting 
to write into domestic legislation what they considered ought to have been in the Hague 
Convention. Thirdly, the analysis of criticisms from the New Zealand judiciary and 
English judiciary confirms that the wording used in s 4 of the Guardianship Amendment 
Act 1991 rendered it unsuccessful at conveying the vital message which Nixon argues 
was lost because of the amendment of 1994. Fourthly, Nixon uses the Fairfax
98
 case as 
judicial authority which supports her contention. However, that case was decided on the 
basis of s 97 of the Care of Children Act 2004 and not the Guardianship Amendment Act 
(No 2) 1994.  
 
It is questionable whether the 1994 amendment achieved much and was worth doing, not 
because the original s 4 was adequate as Nixon suggests, but because it still avoided the 
wording used in the Hague Convention. The 1994 amendment seems to have simply 
rearranged two articles of the Hague Convention. It is further submitted that the 1994 
amendment did not justify the expenditure of the financial resources, the human resource 
and the time which had to have been used to compose it. The judiciary‟s view on the 
effectiveness of the 1994 amendment is reflected in Dellabarca v Christie
99
 in which the 
court stated obiter that the legislature had acted too quickly to benefit from the advice in 
Gross v Boda that the formula method ought to have been used as in many other states.
100
  
F New Zealand’s second attempt to rectify a blunder? The Care of Children Act 2004 
 
New Zealand‟s legislature seems to have made yet another attempt to align its domestic 
implementing legislation with that of other contracting states when the Care of Children 
Act 2004 was passed. It is apparent from the Select Committee Report on the Care of 
Children Bill 2003
101
 that this enactment arose out of the desire to reform and modernise 
the law relating to the care of children and guardianship.
102
 The primary focus in terms of 
law reform was “to promote children‟s welfare and best interests and facilitate their 
development, by helping to ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place for their 
                                               
98  Fairfax v Ireton [2009] 3 NZLR 289 (CA).  
99
  Dellabarca v Christie [1999] 2 NZFLR 97 (CA). 
100  At [100] per Keith J.  
101  Care of Children Bill 2003 (54-2) (select committee report). 
102  Ibid, at [1]. 
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guardianship and care.”103 It is further stated in the Select Committee Report that the Care 
of Children Act 2004 “implements in New Zealand law the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and reforms and replaces the 
Guardianship Act 1968 including the Guardianship Amendment Act 1991.”104 
 
The Hague Convention was implemented at s 94. The term “rights of custody” is defined 
at s 97 as follows:
105
 
 
For the purpose of this subpart, rights of custody in relation to a child, include the 
following rights attributed to a person, institution, or other body, either jointly or 
alone, under the law of the Contracting State in which the child was habitually 
resident immediately before the child‟s removal or retention: 
 
(a) rights relating to the care of the person of the child (for example, the role of 
providing day-to-day care for the child); and 
(b) in particular, the right to determine the child‟s place of residence. 
 
The only assistance provided by the explanatory note with regard to wording used in the 
Care of Children Act 2004 is that: “subpart 4 re-enacts in a form consistent with current 
drafting practice, the Guardianship Amendment Act 1991.” 106 It is submitted that 
changing the definition of Hague Convention terms does not equate to drafting in a form 
consistent with current drafting practice. It is notable that even on its second attempt at 
aligning its domestic legislation with the provisions of the Hague Convention, the 
legislature still chose not to reproduce the wording of the term “rights of custody” under 
the Hague Convention. 
 
Contrary to Nixon‟s position, it is submitted that there is a major difference between the 
drafting of s 97 of the Care of Children Act 2004 and s 4 of the Guardianship 
Amendment Act 1991. The phrase “and to the extent permitted by the right referred to in 
paragraph (a) of this subsection” has been deleted. This removes the possibility of a 
person acquiring custody rights from having had the chance to determine where a child is 
to live by virtue of having cared for that child. It is contended that it was necessary to 
correct that error in the Guardianship Amendment Act 1991. However, there is included 
within the redraft in s 97 an example of the kind of act which constitutes caring for the 
                                               
103
  Ibid, at [10]. 
104  Ibid, at [25]. 
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person of the child. The legislature may have taken its cue from s 5(3) of the 
Interpretation Act 1999 which provides that examples can be used as indicators of the 
meaning of legislation.
107
 However, it appears that by including this example, the 
legislature introduced yet another alteration to the definition of “rights of custody” under 
the Hague Convention into New Zealand‟s domestic legislation.  
 
An evaluation of the judgment in Fairfax in relation to the effectiveness of drafting of the 
implementing legislation before the court, illustrates that the defect in the judgment can 
be linked to the defect in the implementing legislation.  In Fairfax v Ireton
108
 it was noted 
that “the concept of day-to-day care referred to in s 97(a) is defined in s 8: …care that is 
provided only for 1 or more specified days or parts of days.”109 It is submitted that in 
light of the learning from the explanatory note to the Hague Convention and the 
reasoning offered by English authorities, the Hague Convention could not have intended 
to confer custody rights on a person who cared for a child for only one day or part of a 
day. It is further submitted that this dilutes the concept of parental responsibility alluded 
to in the case of S v H (Abduction: Access Rights),
110
which is closer to what was 
contemplated under the Hague Convention. Burrows and Carter explain that the Personal 
Property Securities Act 1999
111
 makes provision for possible inconsistencies between 
examples and a provision by specifying that the provision prevails.
112
 They add that 
“[t]he Interpretation Act 1999 could of course be amended to include a single default 
provision on the status of all explanatory provisions.” 113  Until the New Zealand 
legislature exercises that option, it is strongly recommended that an example should only 
be used if it will assist in the interpretation of the provision in question.  
 
In Fairfax
114
, the Court of Appeal‟s assessment of whether the rights held by a father 
pursuant to an agreement constituted custody rights, depended on the question whether he 
had had day-to-day care of the child as defined under s 8. Chambers J reasoned:
115
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… the father‟s agreed parenting role was squarely within the definition of „day-to-
day‟ care, as set out in s 8 of COCA …The New Zealand Parliament could not 
jettison the use of the old fashioned term „custody‟ in this context, but did make 
clear in the definition of „rights of custody‟ for the purpose of Hague Convention 
applications that the Convention‟s definition of rights of custody,‟ namely „rights 
relating to the care of the person of the child,‟ equated with the new concept of „day-
to-day‟ care used elsewhere in COCA. 
 
It was held that the agreement between the parents did confer the day-to-day care of the 
child on the father. Further, on each of these days the child would have to live at a place 
to be determined by the father, thus the father had custody rights with respect to the child. 
Caldwell
116
 pointed out that the Court of Appeal in Fairfax appreciated that the ruling in 
the Dellabarca v Christie
117
case was different from overseas authorities, but did not 
directly address the question whether the ruling in that case regarding the weight to be 
given to a person‟s ability to determine place of residence was correct. He concludes: 
“the findings of the Court of Appeal meant that New Zealand … will remain out of step 
with other jurisdictions on the critical jurisdictional Convention question of rights of 
custody.”118 It has been noted in this paper that even in the Dellabarca case, the court 
posited that the formula method should have been used to implement the Hague 
Convention.
119
 Therefore, it is agreed that New Zealand is out of step with other 
jurisdictions. However, the courts cannot be blamed where the tools before them, the 
implementing legislation, is defective. 
 
A further observation ought to be made in relation to the implementation of the Hague 
Convention under the Care of Children Act 2004. It creates a possible overlap between 
guardianship rights and custody rights. In this regard, s 16 (a) of the Care of Children Act 
2004 provides:
120
 
 
The duties, powers, rights and responsibilities of a guardian of a child include 
without limitation, the guardian‟s having the role of providing day-to-day care for 
the child. 
 
                                               
116  John Caldwell “Family Law Fairfax v Ireton [2009] NZCA 100” [2009] NZLJ 147 at 148. 
117
  Dellabarca v Christie, above n 99. 
118  Caldwell, above n 116 at 148. 
119  See Dellabarca v Christie, above n 99, at [100] per Keith J. 
120  Care of Children Act 2004, s 16. 
38 Blame the drafter or the treaty? Towards uniformity in the implementation of treaties in domestic law. 
 
 
As noted above, the example of actions which constitute custody rights given in s 97, was 
also the day-to-day care of a child. Therefore, from a legislative drafting standpoint and 
on the strict construction of ss 16 (a) and 97, a guardian may also have custody rights. It 
is submitted this is where the conflict arises. This was never contemplated under the 
Convention.    
G A third attempt for New Zealand? 
 
The above analysis suggests that there is a need for the Care of Children Act 2004 to be 
further amended to properly capture the intentions of the Hague Convention in New 
Zealand‟s domestic legislation. Two main points can be gleaned from it. First, New 
Zealand‟s legislature insists on using the wording method to implement the Hague 
Convention. Secondly, throughout the process of amending legislation, parliament has 
managed to alter definitions and by extension, change the meaning of Hague Convention 
terms. The most recent amendment formed part of a process of law reform. It is 
understood that with the passage of time, legislative provisions have to be updated so that 
they complement the modernised systems which they are intended to regulate. However, 
it is unwise to interfere with the definitions of terms given under any Convention during 
the process of legislative implementation. 
 
Since New Zealand seems resolute in its submission to the wording method it might have 
followed the example of Quebec
121
which also preferred this legislative drafting 
technique. As the Law Library of Congress reports: 
122
 
 
Unlike the other provinces, Quebec enacted the Convention by restating its major 
provisions in a provincial statute … However, Quebec‟s law appears to be 
substantially the same as that of the other provinces [which used the formula 
method]. It did not simply adopt the Convention, because it tries to conduct a 
separate, but not always different, foreign policy. 
 
The Quebec Act commences with an interpretation and application section which mirrors 
the wording of art 1, objectives of the Convention. It is noteworthy that although the 
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wording method was used, the definitions of “rights of custody” and “rights of access” set 
out under the Hague Convention were not altered. Thus, the exact wording used in the 
Hague Convention is reflected in s 2. The provisions regarding wrongful removal or 
retention are set out in ss 3 and 4.  
 
Unlike in the Hague Convention, the heading “Applicability” is inserted before s 5 which 
contains the same wording as s 4 of the Hague Convention. This alerts the reader to the 
fact that the provision seeks to define the children the Hague Convention applies to. It 
was argued earlier that this is not as clear in the Hague Convention. The matter of Central 
Authorities is provided for in Chapter 2, which contains ss 6-12. The legislature not only 
designated a Central Authority as required under the Hague Convention and set out its 
duties, it also elaborated on and set out the ambit of its functions. To this end, ss 8 and 9 
provide for the expeditious handling of matters, set out procedures for seeking 
information about the whereabouts of a child and address the matter of protected or 
confidential information. The issuance of warrants, urgent measures and duration are also 
provided for in Chapter 2 of the Quebec Act. In addition s 28 expressly provides that it is 
the law of the requested state which obtains as regards the determination of whether there 
has been a wrongful removal or retention. In general, the Quebec Act continues with this 
approach of elaborating on issues covered within the Convention. In relation to rights of 
access these matters include the exercise of access and conditions of access at ss 31 and 
32 respectively.  
H  Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the results of the comparative study of the 
implementation of the Hague Convention make it difficult to subscribe to the argument 
that the drafters are not to be blamed for New Zealand‟s unique interpretation of 
Convention terms. Nixon stated that: “[t]he source of misinterpretations of the 
Convention may well lie in the method of implementation that declares an international 
convention to be domestic law.”123 The differences in New Zealand‟s interpretation of 
Convention terms can certainly be traced to its choice of the wording method, particularly 
because despite several attempts, the legislature was unable to retain the meaning of 
terms as defined under the Convention. This supports the argument that uniformity in the 
legislative drafting technique used to implement international treaties fosters coherence in 
the manner in which they are interpreted in domestic law. It is recognised that uniformity 
in approach across implementing states may not always be possible, but there is little 
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justification for the use of limited resources to execute an assault on the definition of the 
terms of an international agreement in the process of implementation. Convincing 
evidence of matters specific to New Zealand‟s legislative drafting scheme which 
supported the use of the wording method is yet to be proffered.      
 
In light of the above, the recommendation is the same as the advice given to the Select 
Committee by the Legislation Advisory Committee which was ignored, the observations 
of the English courts which have been disregarded and the admissions of the New 
Zealand judiciary which seem to be masked by suggestions that it is the courts which are 
misconstruing soundly drafted legislation. The Hague Convention should be implemented 
by the formula method because it is a self-contained body of law. Apart from the United 
Kingdom, this was the approach taken in South Africa under the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act 1996 (SA) and most provinces in 
Canada. In Alberta the Convention was implemented under the International Child 
Abduction Act 1986 SA c1-6.5 and in New Brunswick, under the International Child 
Abduction Act 1982 SNB c1-12.1.  
 
Had the formula method been used in New Zealand, a combination of the explanatory 
report to the Hague Convention and precedent founded on the international body of law 
would have decided matters relevant to its interpretation and assisted New Zealand‟s 
judiciary. The judicial authority examined supports the position that the Hague 
Convention did not require rewording, but if the legislature was inclined to do so, this 
ought to have been done well, as it was in the case of Quebec. What is worth doing is 
worth doing well.  
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IV Same Charter different technique - An examination of the implementation 
of the Charter of the United Nations in Australia, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, New Zealand and Canada 
 
The United Nations is an organ through which member states and world leaders exercise 
extensive powers in a collaborative effort to end all forms of suffering and bring about peace. 
The work of the United Nations spans environmental concerns, human rights, humanitarian 
affairs, economic affairs and many other areas. The Charter of the United Nations
1
 is the 
international agreement by which the United Nations was founded. Simma notes that one of the 
unique characteristics of the Charter relates to the making of reservations. He indicates that 
whilst there is no express provision to that effect, it is generally accepted that reservations are 
not permissible under the Charter.
2
 This suggests that its provisions would have anticipated a 
wholesome embrace from member states on the matter of its implementation in domestic law. 
However, the analysis below reveals that this is not what transpired.  
 
A comparative study of the implementation of the Charter in Australia, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand and Canada indicates that different approaches 
were taken. This has not distorted the meaning of Charter terms, as with Hague 
Convention in New Zealand. Rather, it has varied the extent to which the Charter is 
incorporated in the domestic law of these states. This study illustrates how 
implementation techniques can be used as a means of controlling the impact of the 
Charter on the domestic legal order. Of all the Charter provisions which are worthy of 
mention and require legislative support to be of real legal significance, most states 
addressed only art 41 which speaks to the imposition of economic sanctions. Even then, 
art 41 of the Charter was implemented in different ways. This begs the question why, 
despite the prohibition of reservations, internal laws have not addressed the Charter 
provisions on the imposition of military sanctions in the same way that they have 
provided for economic sanctions. A common feature is that most states resorted to the 
subordination method as the drafting technique to give effect to resolutions of the 
Security Council not requiring the use of force.
3
  
                                               
1  Charter of the United Nations (opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October, 
 1945). [The Charter]. 
2  Bruno Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: a commentary (2nd ed, Oxford University  
 Press, New York, 2002) at 1351. 
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              Regulations 2007; the United Nations Sanctions (Iraq) Regulations 1991 and the United Nations 
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The techniques which have been used to implement the Charter are considered here. The 
consequences of each will be examined, and a draft which seeks to reflect the 
implementation of Charter provisions without reservation, is suggested.   
A  An analysis of the terms of the Charter for the purposes of implementation 
 
In approaching the implementation of the Charter the starting point should be the Charter 
itself, since clues as to the most appropriate implementation technique are provided there. 
The structure of the Charter should be carefully considered by those proposing to 
implement it. Drafters should also identify any differences in the text of the provisions 
and determine whether it is necessary and if so, in what manner, each of these provisions 
should be implemented. The purpose of the following analysis of the Charter is to 
demonstrate how drafters should use the terms of an international agreement as a guide to 
determining the most appropriate technique to implement it in domestic law.  
 
Chapters I to IV, X, XIII, XIV and XV appear to be constitutive in nature as they speak to 
the formation, composition and regulation of organs of the United Nations including the 
Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council and the International Court of Justice. Chapter XVI sets out the 
miscellaneous provisions. Articles, 103, 104 and 105 provide as follows: 
 
103. In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. 
 
104. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal 
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its 
purpose. 
 
105. (1)  The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its 
purposes. 
 
      (2)  Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the 
Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with 
the Organization. 
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Articles 104 and 105 are the types of provisions that alert a drafter to the fact that internal 
laws ought to provide for the recognition of the United Nations as a legal person. Drafters 
should also be mindful that internal law should confer the necessary privileges and 
immunities on the United Nations and its representatives, for the fulfilment of its purpose. 
The conferment of full legal capacity on the United Nations could be addressed either in 
specific implementing legislation or by statutory instrument made pursuant to existing 
diplomatic privileges and immunities legislation, under which the diplomatic privileges 
and immunities referred to in arts 104 and 105 could also be addressed. In New Zealand 
all of these matters were addressed under the Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations) 
Order 1959 which was made pursuant to the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 
1957.
4
  
 
The constitutive provisions of the Charter also signal the need to provide for the payment 
of financial contributions to the United Nations as an international organisation. Article 
17 is instructive as it requires that members provide for the expenses of the United 
Nations. In addition, art 19 sets out the penalties faced by a member in default. Chapters 
VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, XVII and XIX seem declaratory in nature as they set out the 
objectives, principles and ideals of the United Nations. Some of these matters may only 
require executive action. The Law Commission advises that it is not necessary to enact 
domestic legislation to address this type of provision.
 5
   
 
Thus far, the analysis of the provisions of the Charter indicates that most are either 
constitutive or declaratory in nature. The constitutive provisions need to be restated in 
domestic law whilst the declaratory provisions do not. There are other provisions of the 
Charter which require member states to regulate activities internally and therefore need to 
be restated in domestic legislation. This is indicative that the formula method would not 
be the most appropriate technique for the implementation of the Charter as it does not 
allow for the restatement of Charter terms to the extent required for their effective 
application in domestic law. The wording method provides more scope for this.  
 
One of the most influential organs of the United Nations is the Security Council which, 
pursuant to art 24, has the mandate of maintaining international peace and security. In 
order to facilitate the attainment of its objectives, the Security Council is given extensive 
                                               
4
  Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 1957, repealed by the Diplomatic Privileges and 
 Immunities Act 1968. 
5  See Law Commission A New Zealand Guide to International Law and its Sources (NZLC PP 34, 
 2006) at para 47. [The Law Commission]. 
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powers to impose both military and non-military sanctions on states which pose a threat 
to peace. The provisions of the Charter that are relevant to the imposition of non-military 
sanctions are:
6
 
 
39. The Security Council shall determine  the existence  of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. 
 
40. In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, 
before making the recommendation or deciding upon the measures provided for in 
Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures 
as it deems necessary or desirable… 
 
41. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations.  
  
These provisions set out the action that the Security Council may take in its peacekeeping 
efforts. They also extend an appeal to member states to give effect to decisions insofar as 
they relate to the imposition of sanctions that do not require the use of force.
7
 Article 41 
can be described as the type of provision which creates obligations for member states that 
extend to individuals within the member state.
8
 It follows that to properly transpose art 41 
into domestic law a drafter must appreciate the obligation which it sets, then capture it 
using the proper wording. This seems to be an example of the type of provision to which 
Keyes and Sullivan refer when they indicate that the terms of an agreement may have to 
be restated to achieve what it requires. 
9
 If a member state is called upon to act but fails to 
respond, the Security Council‟s efforts will be flouted. However, a state is obliged to 
                                               
6  See the Charter, arts 39-41. 
7  See Simma, above n 2, at 739. 
8
  See The Law Commission, above n 5, at para 36. 
9  See John Mark Keyes and Ruth Sullivan “A Legislative Perspective on the Interaction of 
              International and Domestic Law” in Oonagh E Fitzgerald (ed) The Globalised Rule of Law: 
 Relationships between International and Domestic Law (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2006) at 317. 
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respond only if its domestic laws so prescribe.
10
 This reinforces the importance of 
following the pacta sunt servanda rule. 
 
Articles 43 and 45 outline the more draconian measures that are available to the Security 
Council in pursuit of its objectives. They set out the conditions under which a direction to 
use armed forces should take effect. In this regard, art 43 provides: 
 
(1) All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed 
forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
 
(2) Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, 
their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and 
assistance to be provided. 
 
(3) The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the 
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security 
Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and 
shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes. 
 
Article 43 is a similar type of provision to art 41 in that it touches the rights of individuals 
within member states. Again, a drafter must have a firm grasp of the nature of the 
requirement set by art 43 to properly reflect it in domestic law. In that regard, art 43 
should be construed as a whole. Simma explains that art 43(1) constitutes an undertaking 
by member states to make armed forces and assistance available to the Security Council 
upon request.
11
 However, he is quick to point out that this is qualified as it “exists only in 
accordance with one or more special agreements, and it is therefore transformed into a 
duty de negotiando et de contrahendo.”12 
 
It would seem therefore that the obligation on member states is to negotiate agreements 
which would set out terms under which an undertaking under art 43(1) would be given 
effect. Simma therefore stresses: “member States must conduct negotiations in order to 
                                               
10
  See Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1966] 3 All ER 871(CA) at [875] per 
Diplock LJ and Simma, above n 2, at 747. 
11  Simma, above n 2, at 761.  
12  Ibid. [Footnotes omitted]. 
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facilitate the conclusion of the relevant agreement but no State may be coerced into 
accepting particular provisions in such agreements.”13 It is recommended that as drafted, 
art 43 should not be copied verbatim into the text of implementing legislation because the 
language does not refer to any particular state directly. A drafter will have to restate this 
kind of provision in domestic law to achieve what it requires.
14
  It is the obligation to 
conduct negotiations created by art 43 which a drafter must capture in implementing 
legislation and impose directly on the implementing state.   
 
Article 45 is a similar type of provision to arts 41 and 43 as it affects the rights of 
individuals within member states. Article 45 provides: 
 
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members 
shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined 
international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these 
contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits 
laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the 
Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.  
 
Simma indicates that there are diverging opinions on the relationship between arts 43 and 
45 of the Charter.
15
 Whilst he presented the opposing views he has not indicated a 
preference for either of them.
16
  In order to inform the drafting of the proposed legislation 
submitted at the end of this analysis, it is necessary to determine the obligation set out 
under art 45. In that regard, it is contended that the posture of the Soviet Union which 
stressed that an agreement has to be concluded under art 43 before air forces could be 
released for the purposes of art 45,
17
 is more accurate. Thus, it is the duty to negotiate an 
agreement or agreements pursuant to art 43, for the purposes of art 45, which needs to be 
captured in domestic legislation.   
 
It is notable that arts 40, 41, 43 and 45 do not prescribe that member states are obliged to 
respond to such requests from the Security Council. It is art 25 of the Charter that must be 
referred to in order to appreciate the binding nature of decisions taken by the Security 
Council. Article 25 provides: 
 
                                               
13  Simma, above n 2, at 767. 
14
  See Keyes and Sullivan above n 9, at 317. 
15  Simma, above n 2, at 767. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Simma, above n 2, at 767. 
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The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. 
 
Simma also highlights the importance of art 48 of the Charter insofar as it seeks to 
reaffirm the binding nature of decisions of the Security Council upon its members.
18
 
Article 48 provides: 
 
(1) The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all Members of 
the United Nations or by some of them as the Security Council may determine. 
 
(2) Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations 
directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of 
which they are members. 
 
Provisions such as arts 25 and 48 reinforce the importance of understanding the 
interconnectivity of Charter terms. This is relevant to the implementation process as it 
sets out the extent of the obligation which is imposed on member states as champions of 
the United Nations mission. As noted in Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise,
19
 in construing implementing legislation the courts‟ approach is that parliament 
would not legislate in contravention of its international obligations. Further, where the 
provisions of the implementing legislation are ambiguous, the courts will refer to the 
relevant treaty provisions for clarification.
20
  
 
Keyes and Sullivan recommend that the text of an agreement should be attached in a 
schedule to implementing legislation as it “makes the text as readily available as the 
legislation itself.”21 It is submitted that attaching an international agreement in a schedule 
preserves the interconnectivity of its provisions for the purposes of referral by the 
judiciary. If this is adopted in the implementation of the Charter it will highlight the 
significance of art 25 which sets out the obligation that member states implement 
decisions of the Security Council.  
 
Another notable provision is art 108 which speaks to the amendment of the Charter. If a 
decision is taken to attach the Charter in a Schedule, as advised, even for reference 
                                               
18
  Simma, above n 2, at 776. 
19  See Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise, above n 10. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 9, at 314. 
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purposes only, a drafter should be prompted to include in the implementing Act such 
legislative provisions as are necessary for the amendment of the text of the Charter which 
is set out in the Schedule.
22
 In some cases the definition section is used for that purpose. 
Not only is an international agreement defined, but there is also an indication that it 
includes any amendments to that agreement. An example from New Zealand is s 2 of the 
International Energy Agreement Act 1976 which provides: 
 
International Energy Agreement means the Agreement on an International Energy 
Program signed at Paris on the 18th day of November 1974, a copy of the English 
text of which is set out in the Schedule to this Act, and any amendment to that 
Agreement … 
 
Whilst this appears to be a satisfactory means of managing amendments to an agreement, 
it does not adequately address the question of how the text of the agreement attached in a 
Schedule will be updated. It is therefore recommended that this matter be addressed by 
including provisions authorising the appropriate administrative authority to notify the 
public of any amendment to the agreement by notice published in the Gazette.  
B Overview of findings 
 
The analysis above indicated that different provisions of the Charter require different 
kinds of legislative responses in order to be properly implemented in domestic law. It also 
indicated that in general, the wording method would be the most appropriate technique to 
address the requirements under the Charter. Matters such as the implementation of 
decisions of the Security Council would be best addressed by subordinate legislation as 
they arise, whilst other declaratory provisions require no legislative action. Some of the 
factors which have been identified from this exercise in relation the Charter are as 
follows: 
 
(1) identify the types of provisions in an agreement and determine whether the 
formula method is appropriate or whether the substance of certain provisions must 
be determined then restated in domestic law to be given proper effect; 
(2) include financial provisions; 
(3) include provisions recognising the United Nations, as a legal person of full age 
and capacity; 
(4) include provisions conferring the relevant diplomatic immunities and privileges; 
                                               
22  See DL Mendis “The Legislative Transformation of Treaties” (1992) 13(3) Stat LR 216 at 219. 
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(5) attach the Charter in a schedule to the implementing Act, even for reference 
purposes only; and 
(6) provide for the amendment of the text of the Charter if annexed in a schedule to 
the implementing Act. 
 
It is with these factors in mind that the approach taken by different jurisdictions will be 
considered. 
C   Implementation in the United Kingdom 
 
The Charter was implemented in the United Kingdom by the United Nations Act 1946 
(UK), using a combination of the wording method and the subordination method. The 
Charter is not annexed in a schedule to the implementing Act. It has been stated that 
reservations are prohibited with respect to Charter terms.
23
 That notwithstanding, the 
restrictive nature of the implementation of the Charter in the United Kingdom is first 
indicated by the long title to the United Nations Act 1946 (UK), which sets the 
parameters of the enactment as follows: 
 
An Act to enable effect to be given to certain provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations.   
 
This long title suggests that notwithstanding the prohibition of reservations, the 
legislature‟s intention is to limit the scope of the application of the Charter in the United 
Kingdom. It is submitted that an intention to give full effect to the provisions of the 
Charter would have been reflected in words to the effect that it was an enactment “to give 
effect to the United Kingdom‟s obligations under the Charter.” That option was not taken. 
The long title speaks to the implementation of certain provisions. In the analysis above it 
was determined that it is absolutely necessary to address only the constitutive provisions 
of the Charter and those which needed to be restated for effect, in implementing 
legislation. However, in the United Kingdom‟s implementing legislation art 41 was the 
only provision addressed. It will be recalled that arts 25 and 48 of the Charter create an 
obligation to accept and carry out all decisions of the Security Council and not just those 
made pursuant to art 41. 
 
In that regard, arts 43 and 45 constitute two other avenues through which the Security 
Council can make decisions regarding the use of military force known to member states, 
                                               
23  See Simma, above n 2. 
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yet the United Kingdom put itself under no domestic legal obligation to give effect to 
decisions made pursuant to either of those provisions. Therefore, until the United 
Kingdom takes the necessary legislative steps to enable the incorporation of Security 
Council resolutions made pursuant to arts 43 and 45 of the Charter in domestic law, such 
resolutions will not be binding in the United Kingdom.
24
 This is a clear example of the 
use of drafting techniques to tailor the level of compliance with treaty obligations to suit 
the requirements of the implementing state. It is difficult to reconcile this with the pacta 
sunt servanda rule. 
 
The United Nations Act 1946 (UK) contains a mere two sections. Section 1 contains five 
subsections and s 2 sets out the short title of the Act. Many of the factors drawn from the 
analytical exercise undertaken in Part IV A and B have not been addressed in that Act. 
An examination of the actual wording used to implement art 41 of the Charter, the only 
provision which has been addressed, illustrates how restrictive the United Nations Act 
1946 (UK) is. Section 1(1) provides: 
 
If … the Security Council of the United Nations call upon His Majesty‟s government 
in the United Kingdom to apply any measures to give effect to any decision of that 
Council, His Majesty may by Order in Council make such provision as appears to 
Him necessary or expedient for enabling those measures to be effectively applied, 
including (without prejudice to the generality of the preceding words) provision for 
the apprehension, trial and punishment of persons offending against the Order.   
 
The use of the word “may” in s 1(1) gives the sovereign the discretion as to whether or 
not the United Kingdom will respond to a request from the Security Council to take 
legislative steps towards the implementation of non-military sanctions. This constitutes a 
further mechanism by which the United Kingdom has avoided being bound by decisions 
of the Security Council. Therefore, if the relevant subordinate legislation is not enacted 
Security Council decisions are binding only in international law. This brings to mind 
observations made by Keyes and Sullivan who, speaking of Canada, noted that it was 
under no constitutional obligation to implement international agreements.
25
 The same is 
true for the United Kingdom. However, De Mestral and Fox-Decent, recalling art 24 of 
                                               
24
  See Christopher Greenwood “United Kingdom” in Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed) National 
 Implementation of United Nations Sanctions (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2004)  
at 585. 
25  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 9, at 282. 
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the Vienna Convention, propose that: “[g]ood-faith performance suggests that all the law- 
making organs of a state should participate in ensuring respect for a ratified treaty.”26 
 
Another factor omitted from the United Nations Act 1946 (UK) is provisions defining the 
relationship between that Act and other relevant pieces of legislation. It is particularly 
necessary to include such provisions as art 103 of the Charter provides that a state‟s 
obligations under the Charter prevail in the event of a conflict with its obligations under 
another international agreement. The United Kingdom‟s legislative palette is similar to 
other jurisdictions in that there are legislative instruments other than the United Nations 
Act 1946 (UK) which enable the imposition of non-military sanctions. These include the 
Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 (UK) and the Emergency Laws 
(Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964 (UK). That notwithstanding, the United Nations 
Act 1946 (UK) is silent on how instruments made pursuant to these other pieces of 
legislation are to be construed in relation to those made under the United Nations Act 
1946(UK). It is submitted that this ought to have been provided for to avoid doubt.  
 
A further observation can be made regarding the mechanism whereby the United 
Kingdom can discontinue its imposition of non-military sanctions. Section 1(3) of the 
United Nations Act 1946 (UK) provides:
27
 
 
Any Order in Council made under this section may be varied or revoked by a 
subsequent Order in Council. 
 
Section 1(3) falls short of stipulating exactly what would trigger the variation or 
revocation of an Order in Council made pursuant to s 1(1). It begs the question whether 
the United Kingdom can unilaterally determine that it no longer wishes to comply. It is 
arguable that as drafted, s 1(3) could provide the legal basis for such action. It will be 
recalled that art 25, which declares the binding nature of Security Council decisions, has 
not been made a part of United Kingdom law. Keyes and Sullivan recommend that care 
should be taken in drafting de-implementation provisions as they signal the level of 
commitment by and the good faith of a party to an international agreement.
28
 There is 
justification for this position if the United Kingdom‟s implementing legislation is 
                                               
26  Armand De Mestral and Evan Fox-Decent “Implementation and Reception: The Congeniality of 
 Canada‟s Legal Order to International Law” in Oonagh E Fitzgerald (ed) The Globalised Rule of  
 Law: Relationships between International and Domestic Law (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2006) at 39. 
27  United Nations Act 1946 (UK), s 1(3). 
28  See Keyes and Sullivan, above n 9, at 327. 
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compared to that of Australia.
29
 Australia‟s implementing legislation clearly provides that 
it is art 25 of the Charter, and therefore the Security Council, which determines when 
Australia is no longer required to comply with its decisions. It therefore appears that 
although the United Kingdom is a permanent member of the Security Council and 
Australia is not, Australia‟s drafting technique suggests a greater commitment to respond 
to Security Council decisions.  
 
Greenwood has commended the United Kingdom on its adoption of United Nations 
sanctions, indicating that it has been a “relatively simple task and has not required 
primary legislation or given rise to any constitutional debate.”30 The same can be said for 
many other dualist states. However, the analysis has shown that when this is viewed 
through a legislative drafting microscope, further implementing provisions could have 
been added to make the United Kingdom‟s internal legislative response mechanisms even 
stronger. 
D   Implementation in the United States 
 
The Charter was implemented in the United States under the United Nations Participation 
Act 22 USC §§ 287–287e. The implementation of the Charter in the United States was 
similar to the United Kingdom in that a combination of the wording method and the 
subordination method was used and the Charter was not annexed in a schedule. The 
United States implementing legislation might be described as being only slightly less 
restrictive than that of the United Kingdom. It is lengthier and has a deeper content, yet 
questions can be raised as to how far the legislation meets the United States‟ international 
obligations under the Charter. This will become more apparent upon an evaluation of the 
provisions of the United Nations Participation Act 22 USC §§ 287–287e. The long title 
provides:  
 
An Act to provide for the appointment of representatives of the United States in the 
organs and agencies of the United Nations and to make other provision with respect 
to the participation of the United States in such organisation. 
 
An initial observation is that the long title contains no express statement indicating that 
the purpose of the Act is to implement the United States‟ obligations under the Charter. It 
leans towards providing the legal framework whereby the United States can participate in 
                                               
29  Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth). 
30  Greenwood, above n 24, at 583. 
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matters concerning the United Nations. Sections 2 to 4 of the Act go on to set out the 
administrative support mechanisms by which this can be achieved.  
  
The first semblance of an intention to implement obligations set under the Charter 
appears at s 5 which applies to Security Council resolutions made pursuant to art 41 of 
the Charter. Section 5(a) of the United Nations Participation Act 22 USC §§ 287–287e 
provides: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, whenever the United States is 
called upon by the Security Council to apply measures which said Council has 
decided, pursuant to Article 41 of said Charter, are to be employed to give effect to 
its decisions under said Charter, the President may, to the extent necessary to apply 
such measures, through any agency which he may designate, and under such orders, 
rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, 
in whole or in part, economic relations… 
 
Like the United Kingdom, the United States has several other legislative instruments that 
allow for the imposition of non-military sanctions.
31
 The major difference is the 
circumstances under which powers set out under each enactment may be invoked. In 
contrast to United Kingdom‟s implementing legislation, section 5(a) sets the United 
Nations Participation Act 22 USC §§ 287–287e apart from these other enactments 
through the use of the words “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law.” It 
therefore prescribes that this is the legislation that must be applied in response to requests 
from the Security Council which are made pursuant to art 41 of the Charter. That is 
commendable. On the construction of s 5(a), the President has the discretion as to 
whether he will respond. This apparent departure from the obligatory nature of decisions 
made by the Security Council in implementing legislation was also noted in the United 
Kingdom‟s implementing legislation. Thus, there is no clear undertaking to provide non-
military assistance as and when requested under art 41 as contemplated under the Charter.  
 
In contrast to the United Kingdom, the United States has, albeit very cautiously, 
addressed art 43 of the Charter which speaks to negotiating agreements for the provision 
of military forces to the United Nations. In that regard, s 6 of the United Nations 
Participation Act 22 USC § § 287-287e provides: 
 
                                               
31  Trading with the Enemy Act §5(b), 50 USC App §5(b); Export Administration Act, 50 USC 
 App §§ 2401-2420; International Emergency Economic Powers Act 50 USC §1701.     
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The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the 
Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress … providing 
for the numbers and types of armed forces … to be made available to the Security 
Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in 
accordance with Article 43 of said Charter. The President shall not be deemed to 
require the authorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council 
on its call in order to take action under Article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to 
such special agreement or agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance 
provided for therein: Provided, that … nothing herein contained shall be construed as 
an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security 
Council for such purpose armed forces … in addition to the forces … provided for in 
such special agreement or agreements.  
 
It is important to emphasise that the obligation under art 43 is to negotiate agreements in 
an effort to determine the processes under which military forces will be made available to 
the United Nations, but there is no duty to make armed forces available to the United 
Nations upon request. Section 6 is worded “[t]he President is authorized to negotiate …”. 
As drafted, the provision gives the President the power to negotiate, but it does not 
require that he enters negotiations once called upon to do so. It may therefore be argued 
that this too falls short of the measure of commitment envisaged by the drafters of the 
Charter.   
 
It appears that the proviso at the end of s 6 was added out of an abundance of caution, to 
signal that s 6 does not permit the President to dispatch resources other than those 
identified in the agreement or agreements. Section 7 as amended sets out the 
circumstances under which resources may be made available to the Security Council 
notwithstanding the proviso in s 6. However, none of the measures listed involve the use 
of force and the President‟s powers are discretionary in any event. Further, the United 
Nations Participation Act 22 USC §§ 287–287e is silent on art 45 of the Charter. All of 
these factors serve as another illustration of the way in which a dualist state can use 
implementation techniques to regulate its internal affairs only to the extent that it is 
prepared to, to meet treaty obligations.  
E  Implementation in New Zealand 
 
The Charter was implemented in New Zealand under the United Nations Act 1946. The 
implementation of the Charter in New Zealand is similar to that of the United Kingdom 
and the United States in that a combination of the wording method and the subordination 
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method was used and the Charter was not appended in a schedule to the implementing 
Act. The title to New Zealand‟s implementing legislation is:32 
  
An Act to confer on the Governor-General in Council power to make regulations to 
enable New Zealand to fulfil the obligations taken by it under Article 41 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
 
This is an indication that of all the Charter provisions which require legislative support, 
New Zealand legislated for art 41 only. The title is followed by a preamble which also 
does not extend the scope of the Act beyond the implementation of art 41 of the Charter. 
The preamble seems contradictory in terms because it begins by declaring New Zealand 
to be a member of the United Nations which is bound by the Charter, but acknowledges 
only art 41, reproduces its text and concludes that “it is desirable that provision should be 
made to enable New Zealand to fulfil its obligations under the said Article.” It is 
contended that since there can be no reservations to Charter terms, this approach raises 
the question whether arts 42, 43 and 45 are not as much a part of the Charter as art 41.  
 
The language of s 2, which purports to implement art 41 of the Charter, is similar to the 
implementing legislation of the United Kingdom and the United States. The phrase “the 
Governor-General in Council may … by Order in Council, make all such regulations as 
appear to him to be necessary …” is used. Again, the power to respond to a call from the 
Security Council is discretionary. This does not constitute an undertaking to respond. It is 
notable, however, that the implementing legislation delineates the status of regulations 
made pursuant to the United Nations Act 1946 relative to other legislation in force by 
indicating that regulations made pursuant to s 2 are valid notwithstanding the fact that 
they deal with matters already covered by these other pieces of legislation.
33
 It is 
submitted that the United Nations Act 1946 could have addressed that point even more 
precisely by indicating whether regulations made pursuant to that Act override 
regulations made under the other enactments that deal with the same matter. It should be 
further noted that offence provisions are included at s 3 and provision is made for the 
application of the United Nations Act 1946 in the territories in which New Zealand had 
jurisdiction. 
                                               
32
  Title to the United Nations Act 1946. 
33  See the United Nations Act 1946, s 2(2). See also the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, s 72 
               for another legislative provision which enables the imposition of Security Council sanctions in 
               New Zealand. 
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F  Implementation in Canada 
 
The Charter was implemented in Canada under the United Nations Act RSC 1985 cU-2. 
Like the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand, a combination of the 
wording method and the subordination method was used. On the point of extent of 
implementation, the United Nations Act RSC 1985 cU-2 is similar to the implementing 
enactments of United Kingdom and New Zealand in that it addresses the implementation 
of art 41 only. The long title to the United Nations Act RSC 1985 cU-2 is one of the 
components of that enactment which was used to limit the focus to art 41. The wording 
is: “An Act respecting Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.” Unlike the United 
Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand, the Charter was set out in the Schedule to 
the United Nations Act RSC 1985 cU-2, albeit only in part. Article 41 was severed from 
the rest of the Charter and is the only provision which was reproduced. Thus, although 
the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand did not include any of the text 
of the Charter in their implementing legislation, the text in the Schedule to the United 
Nations Act RSC 1985 cU-2 was adjusted to restrict the focus to art 41. This is yet 
another example of how drafting techniques have been used to control the extent of 
implementation.  
 
Canada‟s implementing legislation is the shortest of all that have been examined. Section 
2 gives the Governor in Council the discretion as to whether he will take action requested 
by the Security Council.  Offence and punishment are addressed in s 3(1), and forfeiture 
in s 3(2).   
G  Implementation in Australia  
 
The Charter was implemented in Australia under the Charter of the United Nations Act 
1945 (Cth). The original form of the Act contained a mere three sections. The title 
indicted that the purpose of the Act was to approve the Charter and this was provided for 
under s 3. Keyes and Sullivan indicate that there is uncertainty as to the effect of 
approving an international agreement in implementing legislation, without more.
34
 In 
reaching this conclusion they referred to the work of James Crawford
35
 who suggests that 
this has no substantive legal effect as it “merely approves the conclusion or ratification of 
                                               
34  See Keyes and Sullivan, above n 9, at 312. 
35  James Crawford, “The International Law Standard in the statues of Australia and the United 
 Kingdom” (1979) 73 AJIL 628. 
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a particular treaty, or participation in international organisations.” 36 Thus, the original 
form of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) can hardly be described as 
implementing the Charter. 
 
Australia‟s parliament recognised the limitations of the Act in its original form because 
several amendments have been made to make Australia‟s implementation of the Charter 
more robust.
37
 The Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) in its current form can 
be described as rather comprehensive compared to any of the other states examined. It 
contains extensive provisions addressing a number of the matters drawn from the 
provisions of the Charter and identified as requiring a legislative response, through the 
analytical exercise above. It implements the Charter using a combination of the wording 
method and the subordination method.  
 
The definition section is one component of the Act which was used to give meaning to a 
number of terms referred to in the enactment. One such term is “UN sanction 
enforcement law” which is defined as “[a] provision that is specified in an instrument 
under subsection 2B(1).”38 Section 2B(1) provides: 39 
 
The Minister may, by legislative instrument, specify a provision of a law of the 
Commonwealth as a UN sanction enforcement law. 
 
Subsections (2)-(5) of section 2B outline the circumstances under which the Minister may 
specify a provision as a UN sanction enforcement law and the conditions under which 
such provisions cease to have effect.  
 
The definition section also assists the reader to locate the text of the Charter through the 
use of notes.  Charter of the United Nations is defined in s 2 as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                                               
36  Ibid, at 629. 
37  See for example the Charter of the United Nations (Amendment) Act 1993 (Cth) and the Charter 
 of the United Nations (Amendment) Act 2002 (Cth)   
38  See the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), s 2. 
39  See for example the Charter of the United Nations (UN Sanction Enforcement Law) Declaration 
 2008 (Cth). 
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Charter of the United Nations means the Charter of the United Nations, done at San 
Francisco on 26 June 1945 [1945] ATS 1. 
 
Note: The text of the Charter of the United Nations is set out in Australian Treaty Series 1945 No. 1. In 2007, the 
text of a Convention in the Australian Treaty Series was accessible through the Australian Treaties Library on the 
AustLII Internet site (www.austlii.edu.au). 
 
The Legislation Advisory Committee advises that notes may be used to enhance the 
interpretation of legislative provisions.
40
 It is contended that this is an example of 
Australian legislation in which notes were used appropriately. In comparison, s 8 of the 
Care of Children Act 2004 constituted the use of examples as interpretative aids in which 
it was suggested that it was not done successfully.
41
  
 
The implementation of sanctions authorised by the Security Council is addressed at s 6. 
Section 6(1) provides: 
 
The Governor-General may make regulations for and in relation to giving effect to 
decisions that: 
 
(a) the Security Council makes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations; and 
(b) Article 25 of the Charter requires Australia to carry out;  
 
in so far as those decisions require Australia to apply measures not involving the use 
of armed force. 
 
Note: Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter provide for the Security Council to decide what measures not involving the 
use of armed force are to be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.  
 
It appears that although the significance of art 25 of the Charter in prescribing the 
obligation to carry out decisions of the Security Council is expressly provided for, the 
Governor-General may only make regulations to implement those decisions that do not 
require the use of force. Further, the Governor-General‟s powers are discretionary. 
Therefore, whilst the drafting of s 6(1) is different from similar provisions of the 
implementing legislation in the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand and 
Canada, the effect is the same. The enforcement of military sanctions is excluded from 
the implementing legislation despite the exclusion of reservations.  The note at the end of 
                                               
40  See the Legislation Advisory Committee “Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process 
              & Content of Legislation” (2001) Ministry of Justice 3A.1.3 <www.justice.govt.nz >.  
41  See Part III above. 
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s 6(1) reinforces this. Sections 6(2) and (3) elaborate on the ways in which regulations 
under s 6(1) may give effect to Security Council decisions.  
 
The Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) is high on content. A number of 
commendable points can be gleaned from it. One is its treatment of the de-
implementation of Security Council decisions. In contrast to the United Kingdom‟s 
implementing legislation, s 8(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) 
prescribes that regulations made for the purposes of giving effect to a decision made by 
the Security Council “cease to have effect when Article 25 of the Charter of the United 
Nations ceases to require Australia to carry out that decision …” This is an indication of 
the Australian legislature submitting to the Charter at least for the purposes of 
deactivating obligations set under it.  
 
Another commendable point is the way in which the status of other legislation which 
gives effect to Security Council decisions is managed under the Charter of the United 
Nations Act 1945 (Cth). Like the United Kingdom and the United States, there are other 
legislative instruments in Australia through which UN sanctions can be implemented.
42
 
This matter is dealt with methodically from ss 9-11 of the Act. Sections 10 and 11 
provide that later enactments do not override the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 
(Cth). Australia‟s implementing legislation has extensive provisions on the enforcement 
of regulations made pursuant to s 6 in Part 3, Division 1. Division 2 starts by setting a 
limit on the number of penalty units that can be prescribed for offences against the 
regulations. It continues by setting a regime for granting injunctions against persons 
engaged in the contravention of the regulations. Part 4 speaks specifically to Security 
Council decisions that relate to terrorism and dealing with assets. Parts 5 and 6 provide 
for offences and information relating to UN sanctions.  A third point is that unlike any of 
the other states examined, the text of the Charter is fully set out in the schedule to the 
Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth). This makes it readily available for 
reference purposes. 
 
 
                                               
42
  See for example the Migration Act 1958 (Cth); Migration (United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions) Regulations 2007(Cth); Customs Act 1901(Cth); Customs (Prohibited Exports) 
Regulations 1958 (Cth); Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 (Cth). 
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H Conclusion 
 
The examination of the implementation of the Charter in the five states considered 
revealed that they each took slightly different approaches. All five used the wording 
method to implement the terms of the Charter and the subordination method to implement 
decisions of the Security Council made pursuant to art 41. The United Kingdom, the 
United States and New Zealand did not annex the Charter to the implementing Act. 
Canada annexed art 41 only. Of the five, Australia was the only state that has annexed the 
full text of the Charter in a schedule. Its implementing legislation was the most detailed. 
The implementing legislation in the United Kingdom and Canada was very short and 
restrictive in comparison. That of the United States and New Zealand included a few 
additions which did not feature in any of the others. For example, the United States 
addressed the matter of negotiating agreements regarding the deployment of military 
forces to the Security Council pursuant to art 43 of the Charter.  
 
Most states limited their implementation to art 41 only and did not legislate for the 
provision of armed forces to the Security Council. These matters reflect the extent of the 
implementation of the Charter in each jurisdiction and illustrate the way in which the 
legislature can use drafting as a tool to implement in domestic law only those provisions 
that they are willing to be bound by. This was done despite art 25 and despite the 
prohibition on reservations. 
 
Simma suggests that art 43 is “far from being implemented.”43 He indicates that it is “one 
of the most important innovations of the UN Charter over the Covenant of the League 
[which] still remains to be realized in practice.”44 Simma explains that the reason is that 
member states seem to prefer to decide on a case-by-case basis whether military forces 
will be deployed to the United Nations for peace-keeping missions.
45
 He also highlights 
the fact that no member state has ever implemented art 45 of the Charter. Simma reasons 
that in the early years of the establishment of the United Nations, agreements made 
pursuant to art 45 would have become obsolete due to technological advancement in the 
weapons industry.
46
  He also suggests that another reason is that it is impossible to predict 
when emergencies will arise and, by extension, it is impractical to expect the Military 
                                               
43
  Simma, above n 2, at 763. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Simma, above n 2, at 767. 
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Staff Committee to plan for them in advance.
47
 Simma‟s views are not without merit. In 
the case of the United Kingdom, a defence may arise on constitutional grounds, by virtue 
of the Bill of Rights 1688 which prevents the raising or keeping of a standing army in 
peacetime, without the consent of Parliament.
48
 
I   Proposed draft 
 
The comparative analysis of the implementation of the Charter started with an evaluation 
of the different kinds of provisions that make up the Charter. Some were constitutive, 
others declaratory and the majority needed to be restated in domestic law to be of legal 
effect. These provisions have been categorised, and the results set out in Part IV B have 
been used to formulate a design for the model legislation below. The provisions which 
did not require legislative action were excluded from the model whilst those requiring 
legislative support were addressed. This exercise was done with a view to bringing some 
measure of uniformity to the implementation of the Charter across member states by 
giving full effect to the Charter in light of the prohibition on reservations. 
 
The aim is to set out fundamental provisions. The draft is modelled closely on the 
legislative requirements in New Zealand and for the sake of an example New Zealand is 
taken as the state concerned. If this model was to be used in another jurisdiction, all 
necessary adjustments would have to be made to ensure that it sits well within that 
jurisdiction‟s constitutional framework. Drafters should also consult the Interpretation 
Acts in their respective jurisdictions for guidance. 
 
As regards provisions for the commencement of the implementing Act, the Interpretation 
Act 1999 provides that an Act comes into force on the date stated in the Act, and if there 
is no such statement, on the day after the date of assent.
49
 A specific date is provided for 
in this model and the Governor-General is given the power to determine that 
commencement date. The power was conferred upon the Governor-General because of 
New Zealand‟s constitutional framework.  
 
The law regarding New Zealand‟s constitutional regime is contained in a number of 
pieces of legislation.
50
 It is based on the Westminster model and the Head of State is the 
                                               
47
  Ibid.  
48  Bill of Rights 1688 (Eng) Will & Mar c 2, s1. 
49  See the Interpretation Act 1999, s 8. 
50  See for example the Constitution Act 1986, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Supreme 
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Sovereign in Right of New Zealand, Queen Elizabeth II, who is represented by the 
Governor-General.
51
 Where the Queen is not the Head of State, an adjustment would 
have to be made, if provision is being made for the Head of State to determine the 
commencement date of the implementing Act.  
 
New Zealand‟s constitutional framework is also relevant to the issue of providing for the 
extension of the implementing Act to other countries. The Realm of New Zealand 
constitutes New Zealand, the Ross Dependency, Tokelau, the Cook Islands and Niue.
52
 
The model therefore makes provision for the extension of the Act to those countries as 
appropriate. When undertaking an implementation exercise for another jurisdiction, a 
drafter should be mindful of extending the provisions of the implementing legislation to 
the countries that the implementing state has jurisdiction over or international 
responsibility for. Such provision would be irrelevant to a state that does not have several 
jurisdictions. Drafters should also consult any legislation governing constitutional matters 
in that other country to determine whether, for instance, after constitution day, a formal 
request and consent to legislate on its behalf is required before legislative provisions 
extend to that country.
53
    
 
As regards the question of binding the Crown, New Zealand‟s Interpretation Act 1999 
provides that no Act binds the Crown unless the enactment specifically provides for 
that.
54
 Therefore, a provision to that effect is included in the model. As noted above the 
legal status of a body corporate is conferred upon the United Nations under the 
Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations) Order 1959.
55
 Therefore, legal capacity is not 
provided for in this model. If another implementing state requires that legal capacity is 
reflected in the implementing instrument, a provision such as the following should be 
inserted: 
 
                                               
Court Act 2003, the Electoral Act 1993, the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, the Judicature 
Act 1908, Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand (SR 
1983/225). 
51  See the Constitution Act 1986, s 2; Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of 
              New Zealand (SR1983/225). 
52  See for example the Niue Constitution  Act 1974, s 3 and the Niue Constitution, art 36 and the 
 Tokelau Act 1948, s 3. The Cook Islands and Niue are both self-governing states in free 
association with New Zealand. 
53  See for example the Niue Constitution. 
54  Interpretation Act 1999, s 27. 
55  See the Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations) Order, s 3.  
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The United Nations shall have all the powers, rights and duties of a natural person of 
full age and capacity. 
 
The process of drafting the obligations under the Charter into domestic law should also 
cause drafters to think about the consequences of a failure to comply with the law. 
Offence provisions should therefore be included in implementing legislation.
56
 It is also 
advisable to include in the purpose clause, provisions that signal the legislature‟s 
intention to implement obligations under a treaty in domestic law.
57
 It is with all the 
above issues in mind that the following model is proposed. 
 
  
                                                   
                                               
56  See for example the United Nations Act 1946, s 3(1) and the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), Part 
 4.      
57  See Keyes and Sullivan, above n 9, at 285.  
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The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows: 
 
1   Title  
      This is the Charter of the United Nations Act [Date] 
                                                    
2   Commencement 
      This Act comes into force on a date to be appointed by the Governor-  
                General by Order in Council. 
  
 
                                                                   Part 1 
                                                       Preliminary Provisions 
 
3  Interpretation 
                In this Act- 
  Act includes any regulations made under it 
Charter means the Charter of the United Nations (opened for signature 26       
June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), a copy of the English text 
of which is set out in the Schedule, and any amendment of the Charter of 
the United Nations 
  Minister means the Minister responsible for foreign affairs 
  public notification means a notice published in the Gazette. 
 
4              Purpose 
The purpose of this Act is to implement New Zealand‟s obligations under  
the Charter. 
            
5  Extension to other territories                                  
         (1) This Act shall be in force in every territory for the time being 
                administered by New Zealand. 
                 
         (2)            This Act shall be in force in Tokelau. 
  
6  Act binds the Crown           
  This Act binds the Crown. 
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Part 2 
                                              Decisions of the Security Council     
 
7  Regulations to give effect to decisions made under Article 41                        
(1)  Notwithstanding any other law, where, pursuant to Article 41 of the 
Charter, the Security Council of the United Nations calls upon New 
Zealand to apply any measures to give effect to any decisions of that 
Council, the Governor-General shall, by Order in Council, make all such 
regulations as are necessary to enable those measures to be effectively 
applied. 
 
(2) All regulations made under subsection (1) cease to have effect when under 
Article 25 of the Charter New Zealand is no longer required to give effect 
to a decision of the Security Council. 
 
(3) Where, under article 25 of the Charter, New Zealand is no longer required 
to give effect to a decision of the Security Council, the Governor-General 
shall give public notification to that effect. 
 
8             Minister to negotiate special agreement or agreements for the purpose 
               of Articles 43 and 45 
Where, pursuant to Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter, the Security Council 
of the United Nations calls upon New Zealand to make available to the 
Security Council any assistance necessary for the purposes of maintaining 
international peace and security, the Minister shall negotiate a special 
agreement or special agreements with the Security Council in order to 
determine the terms under which such assistance will be provided. 
 
                                                                   Part 3 
                                                            Miscellaneous 
 
9  Financial provision          
         (1)           All sums required to be paid by the Government for the purpose of 
                meeting New Zealand‟s obligations under the Charter shall be paid by the 
                Minister of Finance out of the Consolidated Fund without further 
                appropriation than this section. 
  
         (2) All sums received by the Government under or by virtue of the Charter 
                          shall be paid into the Consolidated Fund. 
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10 Inconsistency with other legislation 
(1) In the event of an inconsistency between any provision of this Act and the 
              operation of any other law, this Act shall prevail to the extent of the 
             inconsistency.  
 
(2) No regulation made under this Act shall be deemed to be invalid because it 
                deals with any matter already provided for by any other Act.    
 
 
11 Offences 
Every person commits an offence who fails, without reasonable excuse, to 
comply with any regulation made under this Act and is liable on summary 
conviction, in the case of an individual, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding [     ] or to a fine not exceeding[     ], or, in the case of a 
company or other corporation, to a fine not exceeding [        ]. 
 
12 Amendment of Charter 
  The Governor-General shall give public notification of any amendment to 
                the Charter. 
 
 
Schedule 
Charter of the United Nations 
 
WE THE PEOPLES … 
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V The Different Approaches to the Implementation of the UNESCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
 
The UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
1
 was adopted by the General 
Conference of UNESCO on 14 November 1970. The UNESCO Convention covers not 
only items which have been stolen but also regulates the movement of cultural property 
from one state to another. It has been argued that the UNESCO Convention is limited by 
reference to the protection of a bona fide purchaser who acquires property which is either 
stolen or unlawfully acquired.
2
 O‟Keefe explains that the UNIDROIT Convention on 
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
3
 developed from the need to supplement the 
UNESCO Convention in that regard.
4
  
 
Like the Charter, there has been little uniformity in the drafting techniques that have been 
used to implement the UNESCO Convention. Australia, Canada and New Zealand passed 
specific implementing legislation, but the United Kingdom made no changes to existing 
legislation.
5
 The United States lodged one reservation and several understandings in 
relation to the terms of the UNESCO Convention. This is reflected in the implementing 
legislation. It is argued that there are other omissions and changes in the definitions of 
certain terms of the United States‟ implementing legislation which depart from the 
Convention.
6
  
 
This Part will first identify the various types of provisions which make up the UNESCO 
Convention.  The implementation techniques used in each of the five jurisdictions will 
then be considered in greater detail. This analysis shows the variation in extent of 
implementation that can result where different techniques are used. 
 
                                               
1  UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export  
 and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (opened for signature 14 November 1970, 
 entered into force 24 April 1972)[UNESCO Convention]. 
2  See Patrick J O‟Keefe Commentary on the 1970 UNESCO Convention (2nd ed, Institute of Art and 
 Law, Great Britain, 2007) at 13. 
3  UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (opened for signature  
24 June 1995, entered into force 1 July 1998).   
4  O‟Keefe, above n 2.  
5  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 99. 
6  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 111. 
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A An analysis of the terms of the UNESCO Convention for the purposes of    
implementation 
 
Article 1 outlines the meaning of the term “cultural property” for the purposes of the 
UNESCO Convention. It contains a general formula and also prescribes eleven specific 
categories into which cultural property falls. This type of provision can be and has been 
incorporated into implementing legislation without being restated.
7
 Countries such as 
Australia have taken a slightly different approach by stating that “ … protected object of 
a foreign country means an object forming part of the movable cultural heritage of a 
foreign country.”8 In most cases this matter was addressed by delegating the power to 
create control lists which specify the protected cultural heritage of each state to the 
relevant authority. Article 4 is a similar type of provision. It defines the scope of property 
which forms part of the cultural heritage of a state. Like arts 15 and 17, art 2(1) is 
declaratory in nature and does not require specific implementing provisions in national 
legislation. Article 2(2) speaks to the main purpose of the UNESCO Convention as it sets 
out the obligation to take such measures as are necessary to protect cultural heritage. All 
other provisions of implementing legislation ought to be drafted with the purpose of 
fulfilling this obligation in mind.  
 
O‟Keefe describes art 3 as “[o]ne of the most difficult provisions of the 1970 Convention 
to interpret.”9 This is due to the use of the word “illicit.” Article 3 provides: 
 
The import, export or transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to 
the provisions adopted under this Convention by the States Parties thereto, shall be 
illicit.  
 
O‟Keefe suggests that art 3 may be interpreted such that “[s]tates Parties are required in 
their national law to render imports illicit when they are illicit exports from another 
State.”10 This kind of provision needs to be restated in domestic law in order to be given 
effect. It requires the creation of offences penalising the prohibited activity. Article 11 is 
a similar type of provision to art 3. Articles 6(a) and (b) also need to be restated in 
domestic law. They provide for the issuance of a certificate to verify that an item may be 
exported. Therefore, provisions prescribing the issuance of such certificate ought to be 
drafted.  
                                               
7
  See Protected Objects Act 1975, s 2.  
8  See Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986, s 3 (Cth). 
9  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 41. 
10  Ibid. 
70 Blame the drafter or the treaty? Towards uniformity in the implementation of treaties in domestic law. 
 
 
Drafters seeking to implement arts 5(b),(c),(d),(f) and (g), 6(c) and 14 of the UNESCO 
Convention should note that these provisions are administrative in nature. They call for 
the institution of the necessary administrative measures to facilitate the protection of 
cultural property. Article 5 contains the words “as appropriate for each country.” This 
allows for varying approaches in different jurisdictions. Article 14 requires that the 
necessary budgetary allowances are made to support the administrative functions set out 
under the UNESCO Convention. Although this may be achieved without legislative 
support it is a hint that implementing legislation might contain such financial provisions 
as are necessary to fulfil that obligation. 
 
Article 7 contains several obligations which regulate the illegal importation of cultural 
property.  It is notable that the phrase “consistent with national legislation” appears in 
para (a). A similar phrase appears in arts 10 and 13. Where this type of provision appears 
a drafter is required to analyse existing legislation and fill legislative gaps in order to 
bring a state into compliance with the Convention it implements, in a manner that 
complements the existing legislative palette. Convention terms constructed in this way 
serve as an indication that legal rules regulating this area may differ from state to state.  
 
The obligation set out in art 7(a) which needs to be captured in implementing legislation 
is twofold. The first is to prevent museums and similar institutions from acquiring 
unlawfully exported cultural property. The second is to inform a state which is party to 
the UNESCO Convention of an offer of cultural property that was unlawfully taken from 
that state, if possible. For the purposes of implementing art 7(b) the requirements are as 
follows: 
 
(1) to prohibit the importation of stolen cultural property;  
(2) to ensure that any claim that property belongs to a particular institution is 
supported by proper documentation; 
(3) to set out procedural measures whereby stolen cultural property may be recovered 
and returned to a requesting State; and 
(4) to provide for the payment of just compensation by a requesting State to an 
innocent purchaser or a person with valid title to cultural property. 
 
A drafter should therefore be alert to providing for the designated diplomatic authority 
who will administer the Act, the seizure and forfeiture of stolen property and the 
assessment of compensation to be paid to an innocent purchaser. It is also advisable to 
assess existing customs legislation to determine whether it already addresses some of 
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these issues, whether consequential amendments need to be made and whether customs 
legislation can be factored into implementing legislation. O‟Keefe rightly suggests that 
art 7(b)(ii) is somewhat controversial as the Convention then “reaches into domestic rules 
as to transfer of property.”11  The law on the transfer of property varies in different 
jurisdictions. It is therefore expected that the method used to implement this provision 
would also vary from state to state. In addition, reservations or understandings may be 
made, as in the case of the United States. 
 
Article 8 requires that implementing legislation includes offences and penalties for 
infringement of the terms of the UNESCO Convention.  Article 9 requires that there be 
cooperation amongst states to prevent the illicit import of cultural property where there is 
some evidence of a potential risk. This is another matter which must be properly captured 
and requires restatement in implementing legislation. O‟Keefe noted that there has been 
much debate as to the true meaning of art 9 and whether states such as Australia and 
Canada have taken proper steps to implement it.
12
 He takes the view that compared to the 
United States which requires the conclusion of additional agreements for the purpose of 
art 9, Australia and Canada have taken a broader view of art 9. Thus, the principle can be 
accommodated by operation of the provisions of the implementing legislation in these 
states without more. 
13
  
 
Article 10 contains obligations which need to be implemented through both legislative 
and non-legislative means. Article 10(a) requires some form of legislative enforcement in 
terms of the enactment of penal clauses. It also calls for accountability from retailers by 
requiring them to provide details of the property which they offer for sale. Article 10(b) 
requires implementing states to introduce public education programmes to sensitise the 
public to the value of safeguarding cultural property. Article 12 signals that countries 
which have dependent territories should make provision in implementing legislation, for 
the application of the Convention in their dependent territories. 
 
The analysis above signals that the formula method would not be the most appropriate 
drafting technique to implement this type of Convention. The UNESCO Convention 
recognises that there will be differences in state practice on certain matters and in same 
cases it requires that states legislate for specific matters. Therefore, the wording method 
                                               
11  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 143. 
12  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 72-73. 
13  Ibid. 
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which allows for the harmonisation of Convention terms with local legislative practice, 
would be more appropriate. 
B Implementation in the United Kingdom - No change to existing legislation 
 
Unlike Australia, Canada and South Africa which all passed specific legislation to 
implement the UNESCO Convention, the United Kingdom was satisfied that its existing 
legislation and administrative measures sufficiently complied with the Convention.
14
 
Further legislation was passed only for the purposes of creating criminal offences for the 
unlawful import of certain cultural property.
15
  
 
With regard to exports, O‟Keefe indicates that export control is regulated by the Waverly 
criteria, which consist of two systems of law operating simultaneously.
16
 One is the 
Export of Objects of Cultural Interest (Control) Order 2003 (UK), which prohibits the 
export of cultural objects without the requisite community licence granted by the 
Secretary of State. This Order was made pursuant to the Export Control Act 2002 (UK) 
and it regulates the export of cultural property outside of the United Kingdom. The other 
is the European Union Council Regulation on the Export of Cultural Goods.
17
 This 
instrument regulates the export of cultural property outside of the European Union. Thus, 
a licence obtained under this instrument negates the requirement for a licence issued by 
any member of the European Union including the United Kingdom.
18
  
 
Insofar as it relates to export control, O‟Keefe takes the view that the United Kingdom‟s 
statutory regime satisfies the requirements of the UNESCO Convention.  He takes a 
different line with regard to the control of unlawful imports. After making reference to 
the United Kingdom‟s policy against the enactment of legislation to specifically address 
the unlawful importation of cultural property, O‟Keefe suggests that the United 
Kingdom‟s legislation is less adequate. 19  He makes out his case by outlining the 
procedure for the return of cultural property upon a request made pursuant to art 7(b)(ii) 
of the UNESCO Convention.  He indicates that the first point of reference is the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, which then refers the matter to the Department for Culture, 
                                               
14  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 99. 
15  Ibid. 
16
  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 99. 
17  Regulation 3911/1992 on the Export of Cultural Goods [1992] OJ L 395/1. 
18  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 139. 
19  Ibid. 
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Media and Sport.
20
 The seizure of items is dealt with under the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (UK), where a criminal offence has been committed. The item is then 
returned by Order of the Court made pursuant to s 148 of the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000 (UK) or the Police (Property) Act 1897 (UK).   
 
It would seem that there is merit in O‟Keefe‟s line of reasoning. Since the unlawful 
importation of cultural property is subsumed within a more general legislative regime, it 
is more difficult to trace the safeguards that are in place, especially for a person who is 
not familiar with that area of law. It appears that there are no obvious indicators to draw 
attention to the fact that there is an international convention in operation and that these 
are the pieces of legislation under which it is being administered. O‟Keefe provides 
further examples by way of s 22 of the Theft Act 1968 (UK) and the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 (UK), under which respectively, the offences of handling stolen cultural 
property and money laundering could be addressed.
21
  He also makes specific mention of 
the Dealings in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 (UK), the operative provision of 
which is:
22
 
 
A person is guilty of an offence if he dishonestly deals in a cultural object that is 
tainted knowing or believing that the object is tainted.  
 
O‟Keefe argues that one of the shortfalls in the drafting of this provision is that proof of 
knowledge or belief that an object is tainted is a difficult evidential hurdle to surmount.
23
 
He stresses that although the argument that the Act does not prohibit the import of tainted 
objects has been countered by a response from the Government, the Act does not confer 
powers to refuse an export permit for a tainted cultural object from outside the European 
Union, where there is reason to believe that the object is tainted.
24
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20  Ibid. 
21
  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 140. 
22  Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 (UK), s 1. 
23  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 141.  
24  Ibid. 
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A further observation made by O‟Keefe is that the United Kingdom has done very little in 
relation to the implementation of art 9 of the UNESCO Convention.
25
 He recounts the 
United Kingdom‟s reasoning that the requirement under art 9 that it participates in a 
concerted international effort would require some endorsement from the European 
Union.
26
 O‟Keefe responds by highlighting a recommendation from Chamberlain27 who 
suggests that import controls can be imposed by the relevant minister pursuant to s 1(1) 
of the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 (UK).
28
 He concludes 
with this advice:
29
 
 
It would be necessary for the State whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy to 
negotiate with the UK Government and seek to persuade the Minister to make an 
Order after having requested concerted international action. An object falling under 
the Order when made would become a prohibited import and be liable to seizure and 
forfeiture by Customs. 
 
It is interesting to note that whilst the United Kingdom has been criticised for not taking 
decisive measures to implement art 9 of the UNESCO Convention, the United States has 
been criticised on the basis that its implementing legislation speaks to art 9 and 7(b)(i) 
only, and even then that implementation was unsatisfactory.
30
 
 
The above illustrates that a state may opt to enact no legislation to implement a 
Convention. Whilst there may be an advantage in the sense that it would not be necessary 
to go through a protracted parliamentary process, Keyes indicates that one disadvantage 
is that there is less scope for legislative scrutiny or control.
31
 Another disadvantage noted 
by O‟Keefe is that it requires the commissioning of a search through a compilation of 
instruments which were enacted for a different purpose. This makes it very difficult to 
identify those pieces of legislation under which a treaty is being administered.
32
  
 
                                               
25  Ibid. 
26  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 142. 
27  K Chamberlain “UK Accession to the 1970 UNESCO Convention” (2002) 7 AA & L 231.               
28  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 142. 
29  Ibid. 
30
  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 109. 
31  John Mark Keyes, “Drafting laws to implement international Agreements” (paper presented to 
 Lawyers at the Department of Justice, Ottawa, January 2003) at 23.  
32  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 143. 
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C Implementation in the United States - In accordance with several reservations and 
understandings 
 
Aust claims that “… reservations are generally not so numerous or so extensive as to 
jeopardise the effectiveness of a treaty.”33 O‟Keefe notes that the United States outlined 
its position with regard to the terms of the UNESCO Convention by lodging one 
reservation as follows:
34
 
 
The United States reserves the right to determine whether or not to impose export 
controls over cultural property. 
 
In addition to this reservation, the United States lodged six understandings regarding its 
perception of the terms of the UNESCO Convention. It would follow that the United 
States‟ implementing legislation was drafted with the reservation and understandings in 
mind. O‟Keefe has pointed out that Mexico considers the United States objections to be 
excessive and has put its concerns regarding the United States level of compliance with 
the UNESCO Convention on record.
35
 The implementation technique adopted by the 
United States will be assessed with a view to considering the legitimacy of these 
concerns.  
 
The UNESCO Convention was implemented in the United States using the wording 
method. The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 19 USC § 2601
36
 is 
the major legislative instrument under which its implementation was facilitated. The long 
title to the Act seems imprecise in defining its purpose. It reads: 
 
An Act to reduce certain duties, to suspend temporarily certain duties, to extend 
certain existing suspensions of duties, and for other purposes. 
 
With regard to export control, it was determined earlier in this paper that art 3 needs to be 
properly captured in implementing legislation. It is notable that the United States‟ 
implementing legislation is silent on arts 3 and 6 of the UNESCO Convention. O‟Keefe 
maintains that this omission is a result of the United States reservation on the right to 
                                               
33  Anthony Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
 2007) at 133.  
34
  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 107. 
35  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 108. 
36  Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 19 USC § 2601[Convention on 
 Cultural Property Implementation Act].  
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determine whether export controls on cultural property would be imposed.
37
 He identifies 
the Archaeological Resources Protection Act 16 USC § 470aa
38
 as legislation under 
which export controls on cultural property may be managed, but warns that this 
legislation has not yet been used for that purpose. Whilst concerns regarding the United 
States compliance with the obligation to impose export controls on cultural property are 
valid, an argument condemning its approach would be weak since the reservation appears 
to have been accepted by the UNESCO Secretariat.
39
 It is therefore not surprising that the 
United States‟ implementation of the Convention varies substantially from that of states 
which have not lodged such a reservation. 
 
With regard to import control, perusal of the Convention on Cultural Property 
Implementation Act seems to confirm O‟Keefe‟s claim that arts 9 and 7(b)(i) are the main 
provisions of the UNESCO Convention which have been addressed. Article 7(b)(i) 
provides: 
 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to prohibit the import of cultural 
property stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar 
institution in another State Party to this Convention … provided that such property is 
documented as appertaining to the inventory of that institution 
 
Section 2607 of the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act implements art 
7(b)(i) of the UNESCO Convention  as follows:
40
 
 
No article of cultural property documented as appertaining to the inventory of a 
museum or religious or secular public monument or similar institution in any State 
Party which is stolen from such institution after the effective date of this chapter, or 
after the date of entry into force of the Convention for the State Party, whichever 
date is later, may be imported into the United States. 
 
O‟Keefe suggests that this provision was unnecessary as foreign stolen property could 
have been dealt with under existing legislation in the National Stolen Property Act 18 
USC §§ 2314.
41
 O‟Keefe‟s view serves as a reminder that in order to avoid duplication, it 
                                               
37  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 109. 
38  Archaeological Resources Protection Act 16 USC § 470aa [Archaeological Resources Protection 
 Act]. 
39  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 108. 
40  Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, above n 36. 
41  See the National Stolen Property Act 18 USC §§ 2314 and 2315 [National Stolen Property Act]. 
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is important to conduct a thorough survey of the statute book before new implementing 
legislation is enacted.  
 
Article 7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention requires that requesting states compensate 
innocent purchasers for stolen items upon a request for the return of the items. The 
United States lodged the following understanding in relation to art 7(b)(ii): 
 
The United States understands that Article 7(b) is without prejudice to other 
remedies, civil or penal, available under the laws of the States Parties for the 
recovery of stolen cultural property without payment of compensation. The United 
States is further prepared to take the additional steps contemplated by Article 7(b)(ii) 
for the return of stolen cultural property without payment of compensation, except to 
the extent required by the Constitution of the United States, for those States Parties 
that agree to do the same for the United States institutions. 
 
Article 7(b)(ii) is implemented at s 2609 of the Convention on Cultural Property 
Implementation Act as follows: 
 
In any action for forfeiture under this section regarding an article of cultural property 
imported into the United States in violation of section 2607 of this title, if the 
claimant establishes valid title to the article, under applicable law, as against the 
institution from which the article was stolen, forfeiture shall not be decreed unless 
the State Party to which the article is to be returned pays the claimant just 
compensation for the article. In any action for forfeiture under this section where the 
claimant does not establish such title but establishes that it purchased the article for 
value without knowledge or reason to believe it was stolen, forfeiture shall not be 
decreed unless – 
 
(A) the State Party to which the article is to be returned pays the claimant an 
amount equal to the amount which the claimant paid for the article, or  
(B) the United States establishes that such State Party, as a matter of law or 
reciprocity, would in similar circumstances recover and return an article 
stolen from an institution in the United States without requiring the payment 
of compensation. 
 
The additional clause at s 2609(c)(1)(B) makes the United States‟ implementation of art 
7(b)(ii) different from that of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. O‟Keefe explains that 
in United States law, an innocent purchaser of stolen items who does not acquire good 
title is not entitled to compensation, yet the requirement under art 7(b)(ii) of the 
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UNESCO Convention is that such a purchaser is compensated by a state requesting the 
return of the stolen item.
42
 Hence the reason for the understanding to the effect that stolen 
goods would be returned without compensation, except to the extent required by the 
Constitution of the United States, for those states parties that agree to do the same for the 
United States‟ institutions.43 The United States lodged this understanding to set out its 
position with regard to art 7(b)(ii). Section 2609(c)(1)(B) sets out that understanding in 
legislative terms. Again, these differences in approach can be pointed out but they are 
difficult to challenge as the understanding has been accepted by the UNESCO Secretariat. 
 
Article 9 of the UNESCO Convention is implemented by ss 2602–2607 of the 
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act. These provisions cover a range of 
matters including the authority of the President, restrictions on entering agreements, the 
extension of agreements, information of Presidential action, emergency implementation 
of import restrictions, designation of materials covered by agreements or emergency 
action and the establishment of the cultural property advisory committee. Section 2602(2) 
sets out the President‟s powers as follows: 
 
For the purposes of paragraph (1), the President may enter into- 
 
(A) a bilateral agreement with the State Party to apply the import restrictions set 
forth in section 307 to the archaeological or ethnological material of the State 
Party the pillage of which is creating the jeopardy to the cultural patrimony 
of the State Party found to exist under paragraph (1)(A); or 
(B) a multilateral agreement with the State Party and with one or more other 
nations (whether or not a State Party) under which the United States will 
apply such restrictions, and the other nations will apply similar restrictions 
with respect to such material.  
 
The United States lodged no reservation or understanding with regard to art 9 of the 
UNESCO Convention, yet there are differences in its approach to the implementation of 
this provision when compared to states such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as 
provision is made for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements. O‟Keefe 
suggests that art 9 does not require that further agreements be made in order to achieve its 
purpose. He comments that the United States approach formulates an agreement to agree, 
when the UNESCO Convention already constitutes the agreement.
44
 
                                               
42   O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 109. 
43  Ibid. 
44  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 110. 
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Contrary to O‟Keefe‟s reasoning, the language of art 9 does seem to suggest that the 
cooperation envisaged is to be defined by agreements. Article 9 provides: 
 
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from 
pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other States Parties 
who are affected. The States Parties to this Convention undertake, in these 
circumstances, to participate in a concerted international effort to determine and to 
carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and 
imports and international commerce in the specific materials concerned. Pending 
agreement each State concerned shall take provisional measures to the extent 
feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting State. 
 
It is further contended that the words “[p]ending agreement” are indicative of the need for 
details of any concerted international effort to be set out in an agreement. There is merit 
in O‟Keefe‟s observation that s 2602 (c) limits the United States response in a manner 
that is not intended under the UNESCO Convention. The words “to carry out the 
necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and imports” support this 
position. Clearly, export and import control were not the only remedial measures 
envisaged by the UNESCO Convention. Another convincing argument put forward by 
O‟Keefe is that the United States has wrongly associated the last sentence of art 9 with an 
emergency situation and enacted provisions in this respect, when there is no such 
reference in the UNESCO Convention.
45
  
 
Other notable deviations in the United States implementing legislation which do not seem 
to result from the reservation and understandings made are the seemingly restrictive 
definitions of “archaeological and ethnological material,” 46  for which there is no 
definition in the UNESCO Convention and “object of an archaeological interest” which, 
as O‟Keefe rightly observes, is defined in more general terms under the UNESCO 
Convention.
47
   
 
 
 
 
                                               
45
  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 111. See also the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 
19 USC §2603. 
46  See the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 19 USC §2601. 
47  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 111. See also the UNESCO Convention, art 1.  
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The United States lodged another understanding as follows:
48
 
 
The United States understands the words „as appropriate for each country‟ in art 10 
(a) as permitting each State Party to determine the extent of regulation, if any, of 
antique dealers and declares that in the United States that determination would be 
made by the appropriate authorities of state and municipal governments. 
 
O‟Keefe warns that the use of the words “as appropriate for each country” in the 
understanding does not authorise non-compliance with art 10 and that the United States 
should recognise the undertaking which it signed up to upon ratification of the UNESCO 
Convention.
49
   He further notes that the United States‟ implementing legislation is silent 
as regards art 13(a), (c) and (d) of the UNESCO Convention and instead, reliance is 
placed upon existing actions under which stolen property can be recovered.
50
 This is a 
result of yet another one of the understandings lodged by the United States.
51
 
 
O‟Keefe states that the United States restricted its obligations under the UNESCO 
Convention by a combination of reservations, understandings and its interpretation of 
Convention terms.
52
 He also indicates that questions as to whether the United States has 
satisfactorily implemented the UNESCO Convention have been raised on that basis.
53
  
However, he maintains that there are other legislative instruments including customs 
legislation, the National Stolen Property Act
54
 and the Archaeological Resources 
Protection Act
55
 which support the implementation of the UNESCO Convention. 
O‟Keefe therefore takes the view that collectively these legislative instruments properly 
implement the UNESCO Convention, despite the reservation and understanding.
56
 In 
light of the above, the only comment to be added is that which has been voiced by 
O‟Keefe himself, 57 that where this implementation technique is used, the successful 
litigant will be the one who knows how to navigate the system in order to achieve his or 
her purpose.  
                                               
48  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 107. 
49  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 109. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid. 
52  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 111. 
53  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 113. 
54
  National Stolen Property Act, above n 41. 
55  Archaeological Resources Protection Act, above n 38. 
56  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 123. 
57  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 123 and 143. 
81 Blame the drafter or the treaty? Towards uniformity in the implementation of treaties in domestic law. 
 
 
The analysis above illustrates the way in which reservations and understandings as to 
provisions of a Convention shape implementing legislation. In such cases it is likely that 
there will be a stark difference in implementing legislation. It is difficult to challenge a 
state on the basis of its approach to implementation where reservations or understandings 
have been accepted by the relevant international organisation administering a 
Convention. Differences that are not associated with reservations or understandings are 
good grounds upon which compliance with a Convention may be tested. One example in 
the case of the United States is the limiting or extension of definitions under the 
UNESCO Convention.  
D Implementation in Australia, Canada and New Zealand  
 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand also used the wording method to implement the 
UNESCO Convention and passed specific legislation for that purpose.
58
The 
implementing legislation in all three states can be cited for the comprehensive handling of 
matters under the UNESCO Convention. However, New Zealand‟s Protected Objects Act 
1975 seems to be particularly thorough. The UNESCO Convention is not attached in the 
Schedule to Australia and Canada‟s implementing legislation, but both the UNESCO 
Convention and the UNIDROIT Convention are reproduced in Schedules to New 
Zealand‟s Protected Objects Act 1975.  
 
The benefits of including a purpose clause in legislation were noted earlier in this paper.  
The purpose clause at s 1A of the Protected Objects Act 1975 serves as a reinforcement 
of this and provides: 
 
The purpose of this Act is to provide for the better protection of certain objects by – 
 
(a) regulating the export of protected New Zealand objects; and 
(b) prohibiting the import of unlawfully exported protected foreign 
objects and stolen protected foreign objects; and 
(c) providing for the return of unlawfully exported protected foreign 
objects and stolen protected foreign objects; and 
(d) providing compensation, in certain circumstances, for the return of 
unlawfully exported protected foreign objects; and 
(e) enabling New Zealand‟s participation in – 
(i) the UNESCO Convention; and 
(ii) the UNIDROIT Convention … 
                                               
58  See Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth), Cultural Property Export and Import 
              Act 1974-75-76 c 50 and the Protected Objects Act 1975 respectively. 
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This purpose clause gives a clear indication that the intention is to implement the major 
terms of the UNESCO Convention including the regulation of both exports and imports, 
the return of items whether stolen or not, the payment of compensation and New 
Zealand‟s participation in the UNESCO Convention. Even the UNIDROIT Convention, 
which covers a similar subject matter, has been incorporated into New Zealand‟s 
implementing legislation.  
 
It is commendable that the definitions of export and import are set in wide terms in s 2 of 
the Protected Objects Act 1975. This increases the likelihood of unlawful activity being 
picked up. The definition of protected foreign object is identical to that of cultural 
property in art 1 of the UNESCO Convention. Part 1 entitled “Protected New Zealand 
objects, unlawfully exported protected foreign objects, and stolen protected foreign 
objects” systematically addresses each of these issues with purpose and precision. The 
relevant export controls, offences and penalties for non-compliance with the same are 
provided for at s 5. The note at the end of s 5 indicates that it implements art 3 of the 
UNESCO Convention. It directs the reader to the exact term of the UNESCO Convention 
which is being implemented by that section of the Protected Objects Act 1975. It is been 
pointed out that the Legislation Advisory Committee endorses the use of notes in 
legislation as an interpretative aid.
59
 It is submitted that this is an example of notes being 
used appropriately for that purpose. 
 
The institution of administrative safeguards as required by arts 5 and 6 of the UNESCO 
Convention is addressed by ss 6 to 9 of the Protected Objects Act 1975. Sections 6 to 9 
provide for the appointment of a chief executive whose role is to make a determination as 
to the granting of an application for permission to export protected New Zealand objects. 
Provision is also made for consultation with expert examiners when determining 
applications for permission to export and the issuance of a certificate of permission. In 
contrast, the United States implementing legislation provides for the establishment of an 
administrative body in the Cultural Property Advisory Committee.
60
 However, this is for 
the purposes of art 9 of the UNESCO Convention and not art 6 which it is silent on. 
 
A similar trend can be identified in Australia‟s implementing legislation. Part II, “Control 
of Exports and Imports” and Part III “Administration,” are notable in this regard. Again, 
both exports and import are covered, as required under the UNESCO Convention. The 
                                               
59  See Legislation Advisory Committee “Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process & 
 Content of Legislation” (2001) Ministry of Justice 3A.1.3 < www.justice.govt.nz >.  
60  See the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 19 USC § 2605. 
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definition of movable cultural heritage of Australia set out in s 7 of the Protection of 
Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth) seems wider than that prescribed under art 1 
of the UNESCO Convention. The designated categories are different and s 7(2) allows 
for the addition of even more categories. It provides: 
 
The generality of paragraph (l)(j) is not limited by any of the other paragraphs of 
subsection (l). 
 
The legislation goes on to provide for the formulation of a National Heritage Control List 
which consists of objects which may not be exported without the relevant certificate or 
permit.
61
 The prohibition on unlawful exports and the offences and penalties which 
follow from that are set out at s 9. Section 10 provides for the granting or refusal of an 
export permit by the Minister and, as in New Zealand‟s implementing legislation, for 
consultation with an expert examiner. The National Cultural Heritage Committee, 
established under s 15 of the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth) has 
a role in determining whether a permit will be granted.  However, the powers of this 
Committee extend to the fulfilment of the requirements of art 5 of the UNESCO 
Convention. These include the classification and reclassification of objects to be included 
in the Control List
62
 and its duty to “consult and cooperate with appropriate authorities of 
the Commonwealth, of the States and of the Territories … on matters related to its 
functions.” 63  Canada‟s implementing legislation contains similar features to that of 
Australia and New Zealand. These include the establishment of a Canadian Cultural 
Property Export Control List,
64
provision for the issuance of export permits,
65
 the 
designation of expert examiners
66
 and the establishment of a Review Board.
67
 
 
The implementing legislation of Australia,
68
 New Zealand,
69
 the United States
70
 and 
Canada
71
 all make reference to the application of their respective Customs Acts or 
customs laws. Article 3 of the UNESCO Convention which requires the imposition of 
                                               
61  See the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth), s 8. 
62  Ibid, at s 16(a)(iii). 
63  See the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth), s 16(d). 
64  See the Cultural Property Export and Import Act 1974-75-76 c 50, s 4. 
65  Ibid, at s 5. 
66  Ibid, at s 6. 
67  Ibid, at s 18. 
68
  Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth), s 27. 
69  Protected Objects Act 1975, s10. 
70  Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 19 USC § 2606 and 2609. 
71  Cultural Property Export and Import Act 1974-75-76 c 50, ss 50 and 51. 
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import restrictions, is an example which can be used to compare the wording used to 
implement a particular provision of a Convention. In this regard, the relevant sections of 
New Zealand‟s implementing legislation are ss 10A and 10F(1) which provide: 
 
10A A person may not import into New Zealand an unlawfully exported protected 
       foreign object. 
 
10F(1) Sections 10A to 10C only apply to unlawfully exported protected foreign 
           objects that are exported from a reciprocating State on or after the 
            commencement of this section. 
 
An observation can be made regarding the drafting of s 10F(1). Based on s 7 of the 
Interpretation Act 1999 which provides that “[a]n enactment does not have retrospective 
effect”,72 it is unnecessary to use the phrase “on or after the commencement …”. Even 
further, the section takes effect on commencement and will continue in effect after 
commencement in any event, unless it is repealed.
73
 Canada‟s implementing legislation 
contains slightly different wording at ss 37(2) and 43 respectively, but the concept is the 
same. 
 
37(2) From and after the coming into force of a cultural property agreement in 
         Canada and a reciprocating State, it is illegal to import into Canada any foreign 
         cultural property that has been illegally exported from the reciprocating State.  
 
43    No person shall import or attempt to import into Canada any property that is 
        illegal to import into Canada under subsection 37(2). 
 
Section 14(1) and (3) of the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth) 
provides: 
 
(1)  Where: 
 
 (a) a protected object of a foreign country has been exported from that 
country; 
 (b) the export was prohibited by a law of that country relating to cultural 
property; and 
 (c) the object is imported; 
            
                                               
72  See the Interpretation Act 1999, s 7. 
73  See the Interpretation Act 1999, ss 3, 6, 8(1) and 10(1). 
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 the object is liable to forfeiture. 
 
(3) This section does not apply in relation to the importation of an object if: 
 
 (a)  the importation takes place under an agreement between: 
(i) the Commonwealth, a State, a Territory, a principal collecting 
institution or an exhibition co-ordinator; and 
(ii) any other person or body (including a government); and 
(b)  the agreement provides for the object to be loaned, for a period not 
exceeding 2 years, to the Commonwealth, State, Territory, principal 
collecting institution or exhibition co-ordinator, as the case may be, for the 
purpose of its public exhibition within Australia.  
 
Not only did New Zealand, Canada and Australia use the wording method, they also used 
similar language to give effect to this provision. Thus, there are obvious similarities in the 
manner in which the provision is construed in the domestic law of each of these states. 
Whilst this uniformity in approach may not always be possible, the advantage of certainty 
in the law across contracting states, at least with regard to this particular point, is 
commendable.  
 
O‟Keefe explains that given the approach taken by Australia and Canada with regard to 
the implementation of art 3 of the UNESCO Convention, there have been questions as to 
whether their implementation of art 9 is as rigorous as the United States of America.
74
 He 
argues that such questions were unfounded as these states had the legislative platform 
under which a request under art 9 could be facilitated.
75
 It will be recalled that the United 
States approach was to provide for the conclusion of agreements to apply certain 
restrictions. It will be further recalled that O‟Keefe criticised the United States‟ approach, 
claiming that it amounted to an agreement to agree.
76 O‟Keefe‟s reasoning was not 
supported. It is further submitted that the provisions set out above with reference to art 3, 
are provisions under which a request pursuant to art 9 may be accommodated. It is 
interesting that although the UNESCO Convention does not require the conclusion of 
agreements for purposes of art 3, it seems to do so for the purposes of art 9. That 
notwithstanding, the implementing provisions in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, 
seem to require some form of reciprocity or agreement in fulfilment of the obligations 
under art 3. 
 
                                               
74  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 73. 
75  Ibid. 
76  See O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 110. 
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In comparison to the United States, New Zealand, Australia and Canada are not limited 
by understandings with regard to their handling of the vexing issue of the payment of 
compensation to innocent purchasers. New Zealand‟s Protected Objects Act 1975 
implements art 7 of the UNESCO Convention and the UNIDROIT Convention 
simultaneously, under s 10. Unlawfully exported protected foreign objects and stolen 
protected foreign objects are dealt with under separate headings. Section 10 sets out the 
general import prohibition and s 10B sets out the procedure by which claims for the 
return of unlawfully exported protected foreign objects are to be made. A claim is to be 
brought before a court which, pursuant to s 10B, will determine whether the object is to 
be returned. Compensation for and the costs of returning unlawfully exported protected 
foreign objects provided for under arts 6 and 9(1) of the UNIDROIT Convention are 
addressed under s 10C of the Protected Foreign Objects Act 1975. The restitution of 
stolen protected foreign objects provided for under arts 3 and 4 of the UNIDROIT 
Convention is addressed under s 10E.  
 
Section 10D restates art 7(b) (i) and (ii) of the UNESCO Convention using language 
which is similar to that used in the Convention, as follows: 
 
This section applies if- 
 
(a)  a protected foreign object that is documented as being part of the inventory   
of a foreign cultural institution is stolen and imported into New Zealand; and 
(b) the relevant reciprocating State provides New Zealand with the  
documentation and other evidence to establish its claim for the recovery and 
return of that object to the chief executive. 
 
If this section applies, the chief executive must,- 
 
(a) at the request of the relevant reciprocating State, ask the New Zealand 
Customs Service to – 
(i) seize that object pursuant to its powers under the Customs and Excise 
Act 1996 …; and 
(ii) transfer that object to the Ministry; and 
(b) if that object is seized, return that object to that State if that State pays – 
(i) just compensation to any person who – 
(A) has valid title to that object; or 
(B) is an innocent purchaser; and  
(ii) all costs with respect to the return and delivery of the object. 
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Similar language is used at s 37 of Canada‟s implementing legislation which also 
provides for the assessment of compensation by the court. O‟Keefe observes that “[t]he 
Australian legislation is silent on the question of payment of compensation and therefore 
leaves within the discretion of the Minister the question as to whether compensation will 
be insisted upon as is possible under the Convention.”77 
 
E Conclusion 
 
The analysis above illustrates the various techniques which have been used to implement 
the UNESCO Convention and the advantages and disadvantages of each. Where no 
specific legislation is enacted to implement the UNESCO Convention, as in the United 
Kingdom, there are no indicators that the purpose of existing legislation is to fulfil 
obligations arising under an international agreement. Another point is that the terms of 
the UNESCO Convention may be regulated by more than one piece of legislation and a 
person must be aware of this in order to have a proper understanding of how the 
Convention terms are incorporated into domestic law.  
 
In Australia, Canada and New Zealand, which all enacted specific legislation to 
implement the UNESCO Convention, it was much easier to make out trends in the 
content of that implementing legislation and therefore pinpoint which provisions 
implemented particular terms. For example, the provisions which implemented major 
issues such as the establishment of control lists, import and export prohibitions and the 
setting up of administrative bodies, could be identified in the implementing legislation of 
each jurisdiction. In some cases, the actual wording used was quite similar. It is also 
notable that the UNESCO Convention was not mentioned at all in Australia‟s 
implementing legislation, it was attached in a schedule to New Zealand‟s implementing 
legislation and, although it was not mentioned in Canada‟s implementing legislation, the 
long title clearly indicates that the purpose was to implement the UNESCO Convention.  
 
The observations above must be qualified, however, where reservations have been made. 
This was illustrated in the example of the United States. Compared to other jurisdictions, 
there was a marked difference in the way the terms of the UNESCO Convention were 
construed in the United States. However, the United States legislated on the basis of 
accepted reservations and understandings and so it is difficult to challenge its approach.  
 
                                               
77  O‟Keefe, above n 2, at 63.  
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The implementation of the UNESCO Convention indicates some of the challenges in 
always anticipating uniformity in implementing techniques across jurisdictions. It 
indicates that drafters must take internal legislative systems into account and tailor 
implementation techniques to suit the requirements under the treaty being implemented. 
This suggests the need for drafters to take a systematic approach to the implementation 
process. A proposal setting out this systematic approach is outlined in Part VI, to provide 
guidance to drafters faced with the task of implementing treaties in domestic law. 
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VI Therefore what is a drafter to do? A guide towards greater consistency in 
the implementation of treaties in domestic law  
A Overview of findings 
 
This paper was inspired by the idea that uniformity in the legislative drafting techniques 
used to implement international treaties fosters coherence in the way in which treaty 
terms are construed in domestic law. It was driven by the proposition that the pacta sunt 
servanda rule requires implementing states to legislate in a manner that is consistent with 
treaty obligations. It was further proposed in Part II that good faith is demonstrated 
through the selection of suitable legislative techniques to achieve compliance with a 
treaty. This paper tested the plausibility of using the same drafting technique to 
implement a treaty in different jurisdictions and used examples to explore this. The result 
was that the process is not nearly as simple as it might appear. 
 
The merit of the proposal was made out in the first example of the implementation of the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
1
in New 
Zealand. The analysis of the terms of the Hague Convention and the explanatory report 
by Professor Pérez-Vera indicated that the Hague Convention was a “self-contained body 
of law suitable for domestic application with little … supporting operational machinery.”2 
Burrows and Carter recommend that this kind of treaty should be given direct effect.
3
 It 
was argued that there was little justification for New Zealand‟s parting company with 
many other jurisdictions which implemented the Hague Convention using the formula 
method. It was further surmised that terms of the Hague Convention had a different 
meaning in New Zealand because of the difference in the legislative drafting technique 
used to implement it and, even more, because the restatement of the law was 
unsatisfactory. Hence the goal of uniformity across implementing jurisdictions was not 
achieved. There was strong judicial support for that position both in New Zealand
4
 and 
elsewhere.
5
 
                                               
1  Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (opened for signature 25 
 October 1980, entered into force 1 December, 1983). [The Hague Convention]  
2  See JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
 2009) at 490 and the Legislation Advisory Committee “Legislation Advisory Committee 
              Guidelines on Process & Content of Legislation”(2001) Ministry of Justice 6.2.3 
              <www.justice.govt.nz>.         
3  Burrows and Carter, above n 2, at 490. 
4  See Gross v Boda [1994] NZFLR 704 (HC) at [710] per Whitehead J. 
5  See Hunter v Murrow [2005]  EWCA Civ  976 (CA) at [15] per Thorpe LJ. 
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The second example, the implementation of the Charter of the United Nations,
6
 
demonstrated that differences in implementation technique can result in a divergence in 
the extent of the infiltration of treaty terms into domestic law. A similar exercise to that 
of the Hague Convention was undertaken. The nature of the Charter terms was examined 
and the implementation techniques used by different jurisdictions was compared. It was 
determined that the Charter had different kinds of provisions. Some were constitutive in 
nature and required implementing legislation to contain certain fundamental provisions 
relating to legal personality, financial provisions and diplomatic privileges and 
immunities. Other provisions were declaratory. They set out the aims of the United 
Nations and required no legislative support.  
 
The Charter also contained terms which created obligations for member states which 
extended to citizens of the state. Such provisions needed to be restated in domestic 
legislation in order to be of any legal effect internally. All of these factors pointed to the 
need for substantial supporting operational machinery to be provided for in implementing 
legislation. Unlike the Hague Convention, the Charter is not a self-contained body of law. 
Therefore, the formula method would not be an appropriate implementation technique, 
but the wording method would be ideal. 
 
Another observation about the Charter was that reservations were generally prohibited.  
Despite this, the analysis revealed that most states did not fully implement all of the 
Charter terms. There were also variations in terms of whether or not the Charter was 
attached in a schedule to implementing legislation. Australia‟s implementing legislation 
seemed to be the most complete whilst that of the United Kingdom and Canada were 
short and restrictive. Section 8 of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), spoke 
directly to the relevance of art 25 of the Charter, which sets out member states‟ obligation 
to be bound by decisions of the Security Council. No other jurisdiction demonstrated this 
level of commitment to abide by Security Council measures through its domestic 
implementing legislation, albeit only with respect to the imposition of non-military 
sanctions.  
 
Like the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada used the long title and preambles to 
their respective implementing legislation to indicate that the purpose of the implementing 
legislation was to implement just art 41. All states used the subordination method to 
implement decisions of the Security Council made pursuant to art 41 of the Charter. The 
                                               
6  Charter of the United Nations (opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October,  
 1945). [The Charter].  
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United States‟ implementing legislation went a little further than other jurisdictions by 
addressing not only art 41 of the Charter, but art 43 also. 
 
Having noted the differences in approach which had been taken and the variations in the 
level of compliance which member states subjected themselves to through their domestic 
legislation, a model which sought to fully implement the Charter was produced. This is 
intended to be a guide for states that are yet to incorporate the Charter in domestic law. 
The aim was to produce a model which included the fundamental provisions which 
should feature in an instrument implementing the Charter. However, as the Charter is an 
instrument that has enormous political and economic implications, it is unlikely the 
uniformity in approach which is aspired to will be realised.  
     
The third example, the UNESCO Convention
7
presented another case in which 
contracting states used different legislative drafting techniques to implement a 
Convention. The result was a variation in the extent of the implementation of the 
UNESCO Convention in contracting states. The UNESCO Convention is not a self-
contained body of law and a number of provisions needed to be restated to be of effect in 
domestic law. Implementation techniques ranged from the enactment of specific 
legislation, as was done in Australia, New Zealand and Canada, to the passage of no 
legislation at all as in the United Kingdom. The term “UNESCO Convention” was not 
mentioned in Australia‟s implementing legislation. The implementation of the UNESCO 
Convention by the United States might be described as passive, but it was due to 
extensive reservations and understandings that had been lodged with respect to certain 
provisions of a UNESCO Convention.  
 
Another notable point is that some of the states studied had existing legislation which 
covered a number of issues that were addressed under the UNESCO Convention. In this 
case drafters had to consider how existing legislative provisions could be incorporated 
into the main implementing instrument. Drafters ought to be aware of all of these fine 
distinctions.  The study revealed a number of points:  
 
(1) When no specific legislation is passed it is difficult for a person to identify 
which legislation incorporates obligations under a treaty;  
                                               
7  UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
 Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (opened for signature 14 November 1970, entered into 
 Force 24 April 1972) [The UNESCO Convention]. 
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(2) Where a state‟s existing legislation already covers some Convention matters it 
is unwise to duplicate this in the process of implementation; 
(3) Some jurisdictions have adopted different legislative drafting styles such that 
they may or may not attach the text of a treaty to a schedule to an enactment;  
(4) States such as Canada still use preambles whilst others use purpose clauses. 
Some rely on the long title to indicate the purpose of an Act whilst others such 
as New Zealand have discontinued the use of long titles. 
 
The goal of uniformity in approach cannot be achieved when some states make 
reservations which others have not made. It is difficult to challenge a state on apparent 
differences in the provisions of their implementing legislation where the reservations 
have been endorsed by the institution administering the Convention in question. 
Furthermore, there are matters specific to each contracting state that will determine the 
implementation technique used and the drafting style adopted. It can be argued therefore, 
that what is required is uniformity in the effect of a treaty in domestic law, that is, in the 
end result, as opposed to uniformity in the legislative drafting technique used to 
implement a treaty. Even that is a high aspiration to set due to the making of reservations. 
This suggests the need for some compromise, since it appears that there is no one 
technique that will always be ideal for all implementing states. It is therefore 
recommended that the best way to resolve any unnecessary divergence in approach or 
distortion of the meaning of treaty terms is for drafters to adopt a methodical approach to 
the process of treaty implementation.  
 
The following guide proposes a systematic approach to the process of implementing 
treaties in domestic law. First, it identifies the fundamental factors which must be 
considered not only for treaty implementation but for the purposes of drafting legislation 
in any jurisdiction. These are assessing the constitutional law, Interpretation Act and 
Standing Orders of the state. This is to be followed by an examination of the terms of the 
treaty against existing legislation. The guide sets out the way in which the results of that 
assessment should be used to determine the implementation technique that is the most 
suitable to incorporate the treaty in a specific jurisdiction, having considered both the 
treaty and the domestic legislative infrastructure. It then highlights some stylistic points 
in legislative drafting that can be used to enhance the indication of an intention to 
implement international obligations into domestic law.     
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B Proposed guide  
1 Assess the constitutional framework of the state, the Interpretation Act and any 
Standing Orders that govern the procedure in Parliament 
 
De Mestral and Fox-Decent rightly indicate that the first step a drafter should take to find 
guidance regarding the process by which an international treaty should take effect in 
domestic law is to assess the constitutional framework of that state.
8
 It is from there that 
answers to the question whether a state is of the monist or dualist school will come. Early 
in this study there was some discussion of the differences in treaty implementation in 
monist and dualist states. The main points that resulted from it are as follows:
9
 
 
(a) if it is a monist state, a self-executing treaty will become part of national law upon 
ratification. However, further legislation will be required where the treaty is not 
self-executing. 
(b) if it is a dualist state, the treaty will have legal effect only for the purpose of 
international law. It will be unenforceable in domestic law until implementing 
legislation is enacted.  
 
De Mestral and Fox-Decent acknowledge the importance of analysing the Constitution by 
citing examples.
10
 They point out that international law supersedes domestic law by 
virtue of the constitutional provisions of some jurisdictions.
11
 They also indicate that 
constitutional provisions such as that of Mexico,
 12
 put treaties on an equal status to 
domestic legislation if the treaties are approved by parliament.
13
 De Mestral and Fox-
Decent further point out that the constitution of the dualist state of Canada makes no 
mention of anything on international law.
14
 The United Kingdom has no entrenched 
constitution. It was noted earlier that it is a prime example of the dualist school. Its 
                                               
8  Armand De Mestral and Evan Fox-Decent “Harmonizing the International and Domestic effect  
 of International Law” in Oonagh E Fitzgerald (ed) The Globalised Rule of Law: Relationships 
 between International and Domestic Law (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2006) at 33. 
9  See Anthony Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 
 Cambridge, 2007) at 181-192. 
10  De Mestral and Fox-Decent, above n 8, at 33. 
11  See for example the Constitution of the Netherlands 1983 (as amended to 2002), art 94 and 
              the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982, as amended to 2001, art 90(5). 
12  See the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 1917, as amended to 2003. 
13  De Mestral and Fox-Decent, above n 8, at 33. 
14  Ibid, at 34. 
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constitutional framework is based on the doctrine of the separation of powers. This 
doctrine prescribes that the executive is empowered to negotiate and enter agreements to 
manage the international relations of a state, but only the legislature has the power to bind 
the state through the enactment of internal laws. The role of the judiciary is to interpret 
the law when called upon to do so. Aust makes special mention of Antigua and Barbuda 
in which the Ratification of Treaties Act 1987(Antigua and Barbuda) provides that 
treaties affecting the international affairs of the state must be approved by parliament and 
that a treaty is unenforceable in Antiguan law except by Act of Parliament.
15
 
 
A drafter should also be familiar with the rules set in the Interpretation Act of the 
jurisdiction for which he will draft implementing legislation. Thornton stresses that 
Interpretation Acts are relevant to the drafting process for the following reasons:
16
 
 
(1) They set rules which help shorten and simplify legislation by reducing 
repetition; 
(2) They promote consistency of form and language of legislation by setting 
standard definitions for certain terms; and 
(3) They enact rules of construction which clarify the effect of laws. 
 
Drafters must be aware of the default rules set by an Interpretation Act so that these rules 
can be applied to implementing legislation. 
 
Another standard tool which should be consulted to facilitate the implementation process 
is any Standing Orders of the House of Representatives. The Standing Orders of New 
Zealand contain general rules on legislative procedures
17
including guidelines as to the 
form of legislation.
18
 They also set out the procedure by which treaty terms are to be 
examined by Parliament before legislative steps can be taken to implement a treaty. In 
that regard, the Standing Orders of the House of Representatives provide that the 
Government must present international treaties to the House of Representatives before 
ratification.
19
 The treaty is then subject to national interest analysis and consideration by 
the Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee.
20
 The Foreign Affairs Defence and 
Trade Committee must then submit a report to the House setting out any reasons the 
                                               
15  See Aust, above n 9, at 194. 
16  GC Thornton, Legislative Drafting (4th ed, Tottel Publishing, West Sussex, 2005) at 112. 
17
  See Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2008, SO 249-315. 
18  See Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2008, SO 249-255. 
19  Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2008, SO 388.  
20  Ibid, at SO 389 and SO 390 respectively. 
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treaty should be brought to the special attention of the House of Representatives.
21
 A 
drafter who is aware of these rules will better appreciate his or her role in the overall 
process of treaty implementation. 
2 Examine the terms of the treaty along with existing legislation 
 
This study has focused on the implementation of international treaties in a dualist state. 
The question therefore is how to go about determining which implementation technique 
will best reflect the true meaning of a treaty. The many implementation techniques which 
can be used were set out above. Keyes and Sullivan advise that: “these techniques can be 
used separately or in combination with one another.”22 In order to determine exactly what 
method will be used, it is necessary to examine the terms of the treaty being 
implemented. This was the approach taken in the analysis of the treaties considered in 
this study. It was a deliberate attempt to categorise treaty terms into different groups. 
That exercise showed that different types of provisions call for different legislative 
responses. A word of caution should be added here. The examination of treaty terms 
should not be done in isolation. Drafters should simultaneously review their own statute 
books to determine whether matters dealt with in a treaty are already covered in domestic 
law.  
3 Select the technique or combination of techniques for implementation 
 
The following approach to the selection of an appropriate implementation technique is 
suggested: 
 
(a) No further legislation is necessary-
23
 
 
(i) Where the treaty deals with the rights and obligations of contracting states as 
opposed to individuals within the states and therefore requires executive 
action only;
24
 
                                               
21  Standing Orders of the House of Representatives, at SO 391. 
22  John Mark Keyes and Ruth Sullivan “A Legislative Perspective on the Interaction of International 
              Domestic Law” in Oonagh E Fitzerald (ed) The Globalised Rule of Law: Relationships between  
 International and Domestic Law (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2006) at 310. 
23  See Thornton, above n 16, at 310; Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22, at 324.   
24  See Law Commission A New Zealand Guide to International Law and its Sources (NZLC PP34, 
 1996) at para 47.[The Law Commission] 
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(ii) Where, after evaluating the domestic legislation in force, the drafter is 
satisfied that treaty matters are already properly addressed. 
 
The disadvantage of not enacting specific legislation for the purpose of implementing a 
treaty is that existing legislation would make no reference to the treaty it implements. 
Thus, the courts are not alerted to the fact that the legislation is meant to introduce rules 
of international law into domestic law.
25
 Further, a drafter charged with the task of 
amending an Act may be unaware of the underlying treaty obligations which it addresses 
and treaty obligations could be violated unintentionally.
26
It is recommended that 
consideration is given to whether there could be an insertion into the relevant pieces of 
legislation, perhaps in the purpose clauses, to reflect the legislative intention to 
implement a treaty into domestic law.
27
 This recommendation will be further explored in 
this guide where the need to amend legislation is considered.  
 
(b) Use the formula method if the treaty constitutes a self-contained body of law that 
creates rights for and imposes obligations on individuals within the state
28
 and can 
therefore stand alone.
29
   
 
Keyes and Sullivan point out that the phraseology used to give direct effect to a treaty is 
to provide that it “has the force of law.”30An example of the use of this drafting technique 
in New Zealand is the Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1994 which 
implemented the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods.
31
 Maher indicates that there may be instances where it is necessary to include 
additional provisions which supplement the terms of the treaty being implemented.
32
 He 
cites the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 (UK) and the Recognition of Trusts Act 
1987 (UK) as examples. Supplementary provisions tend to provide for matters including 
the setting up of bodies which facilitate the administration of treaty terms, financial 
                                               
25  See John Mark Keyes “Drafting Laws to Implement International Agreements” (paper presented  
 to lawyers in the Department of Justice, Ottawa, January 2003).   
26  The Law Commission, above n 24, at para 61. 
27  See De Mestral and Fox-Decent, above n 8, at 49. 
28  See Burrows and Carter and Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 2. 
29  See Thornton, above n 16. 
30  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22, at 311. 
31
  United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (opened for signature  
 11 April 1980, entered into force 1 January 1988). 
32  See G Maher “Implementation of Hague Conventions in domestic law: the United Kingdom 
 Approach” (1995) 14 CJQ 21 at 31.  
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provisions and the fixing of penalties for the breach of treaty matters provided for in the 
implementing legislation.
33
  
 
Keyes proposes that two advantages of direct implementation are its relative simplicity in 
drafting and that it maintains consistency, not only with the treaty being implemented, but 
in implementing legislation across contracting states.
34
 Conversely, direct implementation 
does not always properly deal with the impact of the relevant treaty on existing 
legislation. Also, there may be inconsistencies due to translation if the treaty was not 
written in the language of the implementing state and the interpretation of the treaty in 
question may be governed by international law rules that are broader than the interpretive 
rules of national courts.
35
 In his joint paper with Sullivan, Keyes further warns that hardly 
any international treaty can be drafted to fit comfortably with the administrative system, 
the court system and the related internal laws of all contracting states.
36
 Keyes‟ point is 
highly relevant to this paper. It suggests that it is fanciful to expect the same 
implementation technique to work well in all contracting states. Hence the need for a 
reasoned approach to the process. 
 
In light of the foregoing, where the formula method is being considered, the 
recommendation is to undertake a careful evaluation of the treaty with a view to 
identifying which provisions of the treaty require further legislative support.  Keyes and 
Sullivan prescribe that the administrative and enforcement measures set out in internal 
laws should also be assessed to determine whether they adequately support the purpose of 
the treaty being implemented.
37
 Supplementary provisions should be added only if they 
do not because the aim should be to implement the treaty not merely in form but also in 
substance.
38
  
 
(c) The wording method should be used – 
 
(i) if the treaty is not self-executing; 
(ii) if the treaty expressly provides that states take the necessary legislative 
steps to give effect to certain provisions within it; or 
                                               
33  Ibid. 
34  John Mark Keyes, above n 25. 
35
  Ibid. 
36  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22, at 316. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid. 
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(iii) if the language used in the treaty is so far removed from that commonly 
used in the relevant jurisdiction that the treaty terms would not sit well 
with existing legislation. 
 
Mendis indicates that treaties are very often set in general terms for the purpose of 
facilitating agreement amongst participating states.
39
 In such instances the detail required 
to achieve the purpose of the treaty is omitted. Keyes and Sullivan advise that a 
restatement of the terms of a treaty may be necessary to expound upon the principles that 
a treaty sets.
40
 They add that this can be achieved through the enactment of one piece of 
implementing legislation or the amendment of several pieces of legislation.
41
   
 
De Mestral and Fox-Decent maintain that the wording method is very often used because 
of the need to have the language used in implementing legislation complement that of 
existing statutes governing the same area of law.
42
 In support of this they give the 
example of the Canadian domestic legislation implementing treaties governing trade 
remedies and insist upon “the desire to have the law on all fours with Canadian 
administrative law, which forms the basic regulatory matrix and deep structure of the 
law.”43 Maher takes a similar line. He discusses the use of the wording method for the 
purpose of implementing Hague Conventions in the United Kingdom. Maher‟s 
contribution to that discussion is as follows:
44
 
 
This approach has the advantages of stating the law in the terms and principles 
familiar to United Kingdom lawyers and is particularly appropriate when used in a 
statute which deals not only with the implementation of a Hague Convention but also 
with related matters, as with the Acts on divorce recognition and evidence abroad. 
 
The Law Commission explains that some characteristics of a treaty that require 
implementation using the wording method are that it may either empower a state to take 
action or create a duty to take internal legislative action.
45
 The Tokyo Convention on 
Offences and certain other acts Committed on Board Aircraft
46
 is cited as an example of a 
                                               
39  See DL Mendis “The Legislative Transformation of Treaties” (1992) 13(3) Stat L R 216.  
40  See Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22, at 317. 
41  Ibid. 
42  See De Mestral and Fox-Decent above n 8, at 48. 
43
  Ibid. 
44  Maher, above n 32, at 31. 
45  The Law Commission, above n 24, at para 50. 
46  Tokyo Convention on Offences and certain other acts Committed on Board Aircraft (opened for 
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treaty which calls for internal responses by legislative means.
47
 The Commission cites art 
4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination
48
 as a provision which creates a duty to enact domestic legislation in 
response to it.
49
 Article 4(a) provides: 
 
States Parties … shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of 
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as 
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of 
persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to 
racist activities including the financing thereof;  
 
This provision clearly requires the creation of different kinds of offences. This can be 
best achieved by the wording method. 
 
The above constitute some guidelines as to how to determine whether the wording 
method is appropriate and the advantages of its use. However, there are drawbacks of 
which drafters must be equally aware. Keyes and Sullivan warn that the process of 
restating treaty terms should be undertaken with caution because the meaning of certain 
words may change depending on the context in which they are used.
50
 They indicate that 
when treaty terms are transposed into domestic legislation that domestic legislation is 
subject to domestic rules of interpretation as opposed to international interpretative 
rules.
51
Another caveat closely related to this is that the meaning of treaty terms could be 
distorted if they are replaced by words that do not capture their true meaning. This was 
illustrated in the first example of the implementation of the Hague Convention
52
 in New 
Zealand.   
 
The recommendation, therefore, is that drafters be aware of the slight variances in the 
meaning of words when choosing those which would replace treaty terms. Drafters 
should also be mindful of the role of domestic courts when called upon to interpret 
implementing legislation and ensure that the drafting is expedited in a matter which 
                                               
 signature 14 September 1963, entered into force 4 December 1969).  
47  The Law Commission, above n 24, at para 50. 
48  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (opened for 
 signature 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969). 
49
  The Law Commission, above n 24, at para 50. 
50  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22, at 317. 
51  Ibid. 
52  The Hague Convention, above n 1. 
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reflects the true meaning of the treaty concerned. Keyes and Sullivan emphasise that 
drafters also should be very thorough where the wording method is selected because: “[i]f 
nothing is said about a particular provision in the implementing legislation, it is not 
implemented.”53   
 
(d) Amend existing legislation – 
 
(i) if the subject matter covered in the treaty is dealt with in domestic 
legislation that needs to be reviewed or updated; 
(ii) if the treaty covers more than one subject matter which is addressed in 
more than one piece of legislation.   
 
Another feature of the wording method is the amendment of several pieces of legislation.  
Where amendments are being made there should also be some indication that the purpose 
was to give effect to a treaty. This can be done by modifying the purpose clauses. De 
Mestral and Fox-Decent warn that even this may not be enough, because Canadian courts 
have been known to disregard such legislative statements where the text of the legislation 
itself does not clearly use treaty terms.
54
 As they have indicated: “despite including the 
express statement in the NAFTA Act that „[t]he purpose of this Act is to implement the 
Agreement,‟ NAFTA55 has never been given direct effect by Canadian courts … .”56 
They give the examples of the cases of Industries Hillenbrand Canada Ltée v Québec
57
 
and Pfizer Inc v Canada
58
 as illustrations. These examples reinforce the point that every 
effort must be made to properly capture the meaning of treaty terms in domestic 
legislation if the wording method is being used. 
 
Thornton acknowledges the merits of the arguments noted above. However, he advises 
that it may be impractical to refer to the treaty being implemented and indicate the 
purpose of the legislation where a treaty covers very wide areas of law.
59
 He makes 
special reference to the human rights treaties in this regard. This view is supported by the 
Law Commission which recommends that this approach be taken for the implementation 
                                               
53  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22, at 317. 
54  De Mestral and Fox-Decent, above n 8, at 49. 
55  North American Free Trade Agreement (entered into force 17 December 1992). 
56  Ibid. 
57
  Industries Hillenbrand Canada Ltée v Québec (Bureau de normalization) [2002] JQ no 3811 at 
 191(CS). 
58  Pfizer Inc v Canada [1999] 4 FC 441 at 45(TD). 
59  Thornton, above n 16, at 311. 
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of human rights conventions including the 1966 International Conventions and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
60
 Most 
of the provisions of the Convention on Discrimination Against Women are prefixed by 
the phrase “[s]tates parties shall take all appropriate measures to… .” It insists upon 
protection for women in a cross-section of areas including family, education, social and 
cultural patterns of conduct, trafficking in women, exploitation of prostitution of women, 
eligibility for employment and equality in the field of health care. This gives some 
indication of the impracticability of referring to the Convention on Discrimination 
Against Women in all of the legislative instruments that will require some form of 
amendment. 
 
(e) The subordination method should be used – 
 
(i) if the subject matter covered by the treaty is highly technical and requires 
further detail in order to take effect; 
(ii) if matters dealt with under a treaty are highly regulatory and would require 
frequent amendments or updating.
61
 
 
Where the subordination method is used, the power to implement a treaty is typically 
delegated to an executive or administrative authority. As the Law Commission advises, 
this drafting technique is particularly appropriate where Parliament has already endorsed 
the general policy being implemented and need not be involved with its routine 
application.
62
 In the example of the implementation of art 41 of the Charter, almost all 
contracting states considered were settled on the policy, which was to implement Security 
Council decisions not involving the use of force. Hence the similarity in approach 
regarding the use of the subordination method to gave effect to these decisions as they 
were being made from time to time. The subordination method is often used in the areas 
of civil aviation, shipping and environmental protection.  
 
De Mestral and Fox-Decent
63
 and Keyes and Sullivan
64
 make recommendations similar to 
the Law Commission regarding the appropriateness of the use of the subordination 
                                               
60  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (opened for 
signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981)[Convention on Discrimination 
Against Women]; The Law Commission, above n 24, at para 56. 
61
  See the Law Commission, above n 24, at para 62. 
62  Ibid. 
63  De Mestral and Fox-Decent, above n 8, at 51. 
64  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22. 
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method of implementation. They both proffer the example of s 35(1)(d) of the Canada 
Shipping Act 2001
65
 which provides: 
 
The Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister of Transport, 
make regulations implementing … an international convention, protocol or 
resolution that is listed in Schedule 1, as amended from time to time, including 
regulations 
 
(i) implementing it in respect of persons, vessels or oil handling facilities to 
which it does not apply, 
(ii) establishing stricter standards than it sets out, or 
(iii) establishing additional or complementary standards to those it sets out if 
the Governor in Council is satisfied that the additional or complementary 
standards meet the objectives of the convention, protocol or resolution;  
 
In their consideration of the merits of the subordination method De Mestral and Fox-
Decent and Keyes and Sullivan seem to overlook an important point which Mendis raises 
in his work. That is the question of judicial review of executive action where extensive 
powers are granted for the purposes of implementing a treaty.
66
 Mendis indicates that 
such executive action is not usually scrutinised by the courts for illegality based on a 
contravention of the intentions of a treaty. He notes Crawford‟s justification for this 
position in which he explains that courts are slow to challenge the executive on that basis 
as it would “result in the elevation of a treaty to the status of a higher law.”67 Keyes raises 
the important question of what becomes of regulations that are made to give effect to an 
agreement which is subsequently terminated.
68
 The regulations may have to be 
immediately revoked. All of these issues suggest that drafters must be particularly 
vigilant when the subordination method is used to implement a treaty.  
 
(f) Use a combination of methods – 
 
(i) for the purpose of incorporating the meaning of expressions used in a treaty 
in domestic law; 
(ii) to adapt treaty terms to distinctive characteristics of the jurisdiction 
implementing a treaty. 
 
                                               
65
  Canada Shipping Act SC 2001 c 26. 
66  Mendis, above n 39, at 225. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Keyes, above n 25, at 29. 
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Keyes and Sullivan state that: [t]here is no requirement to use only one technique to 
implement a particular treaty.”69 One such example is the implementation of the Charter 
of the United Nations for which most implementing jurisdictions used a combination of 
the wording method and the subordination method. Also, there may be instances where 
the wording method is the most suitable method to transpose most of the terms of a treaty 
into domestic law, yet the legislature my wish to incorporate its definitions directly. One 
example is s 2(2) of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act 1995
70
 
which provides: 
 
Unless the context otherwise requires, all words and expressions used in this Act 
have the same meaning as in the Convention. 
 
Keyes and Sullivan give s 3(1) of the Geneva Conventions Act 1985
71
 as another 
example of the combination of the wording method and the formula method being used. 
Section 3(1) provides: 
 
Every person who, whether within or outside Canada, commits a grave breach 
referred to in Article 50 of Schedule 1, Article 51 of Schedule II, Article 130 of 
Schedule III, Article 147 of Schedule IV or Article 11 or 85 of Schedule V is guilty 
of an indictable offence, and 
 
(a) if the grave breach causes the death of any person, is liable to 
imprisonment for life; and  
(b) in any other case, is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
fourteen years.  
 
As they explain: “[b]y making a person „guilty of an indictable offence,‟ this provision 
engages the provisions of the Criminal Code for the investigation and prosecution of such 
offences.”72 This reflects a combination of the Geneva Conventions which were directly 
incorporated and the Criminal Code which is a creature of Canada‟s domestic law.  
 
 
                                               
69
  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22, at 325. 
70  Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act SC 1995 c 25, s 2(2). 
71  Geneva Conventions Act RSC 1985 c G-3. 
72  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22, at 326. 
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4 Some finer stylistic details which can be used to emphasise the intention to implement 
the terms of an international agreement   
 
The foregoing outlined the matters to be considered by drafters in the process of deciding 
which legislative drafting technique should be used to implement a treaty. For the actual 
drafting of the implementing provisions, a drafter should ensure that the aids to 
construction of the implementing legislation are properly used to indicate that the rules 
set out in an international treaty are in operation. All matters that are relevant to the 
operation of the treaty should be evident on the face of the legislation. In that regard, it is 
recommended that close attention is paid to the following:  
 
(a) The long title 
 
The long title should be used to indicate that the object of the implementing enactment is 
to incorporate treaty terms into domestic law. 
 
(b) The definition section 
 
The treaty being implemented should be located and defined in the definition section and 
a shorter reference name may also be given. This helps shorten the text of the enactment 
by avoiding the repetition of the full title of the treaty. 
 
(c) The purpose clause 
 
As far as possible, the implementation of a treaty in domestic law should feature as one of 
the purposes of any enactment implementing a treaty. In some jurisdictions such as 
Canada, preambles are still being used for this purpose. Thornton advises that preambles 
are archaic and should be gradually replaced by purpose clauses.
73
 One example in New 
Zealand legislation is s 3 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 which provides: 
 
The purpose of this Act is – 
 
(a) to make further provision in New Zealand law for the suppression of 
terrorism; and 
(b)  to make provision to implement in New Zealand law New Zealand‟s 
obligations under – 
                                               
73  See Thornton, above n 16, at 312. 
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(i) the Bombings Convention; and  
(ii) the Financing Convention; and 
(iii) the Anti-terrorism Resolution; and 
(iv) the Nuclear Material Convention; and 
(v) the Plastic Explosives Convention; and 
(vi) the Nuclear Terrorism Convention … 
  
(d) Make provision to eliminate inconsistencies with other legislation in force. 
 
The Caribbean Community Act Cap 19.21 of Saint Lucia implements the Revised Treaty 
of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy
74
 in Saint Lucia‟s domestic law. The treaty is defined in the 
interpretation section, attached in the Schedule to the Act and given the force of law in s 
3. Inconsistency with other legislation is provided for in s 7 as follows: 
 
In the event of any inconsistency between the provisions of this Act and the 
operation of any other law, the provisions of this Act shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency.  
 
Another example is s 6 of Saint Lucia‟s Mutual Assistance (Extension and Application to 
USA) Regulations Cap. 3.03, which provides: 
 
Where there is any inconsistency or conflict between the treaties referred to in 
regulations 4 and 5, and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act or the 
Proceeds of Crime Act, the Treaty shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency or 
conflict.  
 
(e) Make provision to avoid inconsistencies between the official text of the treaty and 
unofficial translations of the text of the treaty. 
 
The meaning of certain words may be lost when translated from one language to another. 
Thornton advises that any possible adverse effects of this kind should be countered by 
providing for these kinds of inconsistencies in implementing legislation.
75
 He gives the 
example of the s 1(8) of the Carriage by Air Act 1961(UK) which provides: 
 
                                               
74  Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM  
 Single Market and Economy (entered into force 1 January 2006). 
75  Thornton, above n 16, at 314. 
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If there is any inconsistency between the text in English in Part 1 of Schedule 1 or 
1A and the text in French in Part II of that Schedule, the French text shall prevail. 
 
(f) Attach the treaty in a schedule to the implementing legislation, even if for 
reference purposes only, wherever possible. 
 
It is advised that the text of a treaty being implemented in domestic law is appended in a 
schedule to the implementing legislation particularly where the formula method is used.
76
 
This makes the work of the court easier as a copy of the text of the treaty is annexed to 
the enactment that incorporates it into domestic law. It may sometimes be impractical to 
attach the text of a treaty in a schedule.
77
 One example is where implementation is 
effected by amending several pieces of legislation. Drafters should therefore use their 
judgment in determining whether or not it is appropriate to attach a treaty to an Act which 
implements a treaty. However, the recommendation is that it be done whenever it is 
possible.  
 
(g) Indicate what reservations have been made to the treaty. 
 
Maher stresses that omitting treaty terms with regard to which reservations have been 
made from implementing legislation is insufficient to alert the court that such 
reservations have been made.
78
 He further notes that the court can have regard to a treaty 
provision that is omitted from implementing legislation and therefore recommends that 
wherever a reservation has been made this should be expressly stated in the enabling 
legislation. Maher highlights the following as an example which is well drafted:
79
 
 
The United Kingdom having made such a reservation as is mentioned in the third 
paragraph of Article 26 of the Convention, the costs mentioned in that paragraph 
shall not be borne by any Minister or other authority in the United Kingdom … 
 
The Hague Convention is located and defined at s1(1) of the Child Abduction and 
Custody Act 1985(UK) and is attached at sch 1. This is an example of drafters using the 
aid to construction to fully indicate the extent to which the Hague Convention applies in 
the United Kingdom‟s domestic law. Van Loon refers to the Westinghouse 80case to 
                                               
76  See Mendis, above n 39, at 219. 
77
  See the Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 2, at para 6.2.2. 
78  See Maher, above n 32, at 33. 
79  Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 (UK), s 11. 
80  Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] 1 All ER 434 (HL). 
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highlight the problems that can arise when implementing legislation does not expressly 
state which reservations have been made with regard to a treaty.
81
  
 
The enactment considered by the court in that case was the Evidence (Proceedings in 
Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 (UK) which implemented the Hague Convention on the 
taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.
82
 The United Kingdom 
entered a reservation with respect to pre-trial discovery of documents pursuant to art 23 
of the Convention, but there was no indication of this in the enabling legislation. The 
Court of Appeal mistakenly assumed that the United Kingdom had not lodged such 
reservation and made a ruling on the basis of that supposition.  Fortunately, the judges of 
the House of Lords were aware of the reservation and were therefore able to consider 
submissions with this in mind. 
 
(h) Consider drafting provisions in anticipation of the conclusion of other treaties 
dealing with same subject matter. 
 
Keyes and Sullivan suggest that where a state anticipates concluding further agreements 
of a similar nature with a number of other states, the interpretation section of the 
implementing enactment should be used to provide a general definition characterising the 
kinds of agreements which will be covered by the Act.
83
 The example of the Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1985
84
is cited in this regard. The word 
“agreement” is defined as follows: 
 
“agreement” means a treaty, convention or other international agreement that is in 
force, to which Canada is a party and that contains a provision respecting mutual 
legal assistance in criminal matters;  
 
The word “agreement” is used throughout the enactment and the meaning set out above 
applies. The advantage is that it allows for a tidier statute book by making provision for 
the implementation of more than one agreement by the same statute, immediately upon 
ratification. 
  
                                               
81  JHA Van Loon “The Hague Conference and its Conventions” in Francis G Jacobs and Shelley 
 Roberts The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1987).  
82
  Hague Convention on the taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (opened for 
 signature 18 March 1970, entered into force 7 October 1972), at 232. 
83  Keyes and Sullivan, above n 22, at 321. 
84  Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act RS 1985 c 30, s 1(1). 
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VII  Conclusion 
 
This study has found support in academic literature
85
 and in the judgments of the court
86
 
for the general principle of international uniformity in the legislation implementing 
treaties. It shows that uniformity in legislative implementation techniques used in 
contracting states does promote consistency and that it should therefore be aspired to. The 
study also underscored the disparity that can result not only in the meaning of treaty 
terms, but also in the extent of implementation, when one state deviates from the 
approach taken by other implementing states without proper justification.  
 
A step-by-step analysis of three examples was undertaken to demonstrate how drafters 
should go about identifying and categorising treaty terms. In the process, the study 
showed that not only are there different kinds of provisions in a treaty, but that each 
requires a different kind of legislative response. In addition, states‟ legal systems differ 
and may differ significantly. Therefore, it is not always practical for all contracting states 
to conform to the same technique in implementing a particular treaty.  In light of the 
foregoing, this study has formulated a guide to assist drafters in the legislative 
implementation of treaties in a manner that will bring about greater coherence in the 
construction of treaty terms in domestic law.  
 
Uniformity in implementation techniques should be followed where internal legislative 
schemes permit. Where this is not possible, differing techniques may be used but 
uniformity in the construction of treaty terms should not be compromised.
 87
 This 
approach is in keeping with the objective of good faith in the implementation of treaties 
amongst contracting states. The paper has identified the best practices to ensure that it is 
achieved.  Pacta sunt servanda! 
 
 
 
 
                                               
85  See JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) 
 at 487. 
86  See Re H(minors)(abduction: acquiescence)[1998] AC 72 (HL) at [87] per Lord Browne- 
              Wilkinson; Hunter v Murrow [2005] EWCA Civ 976 (CA) at 15-18 per Thorpe LJ; Gross v 
              Boda [1995] NZFLR 49 (HC) at 51, per McKay J; Re D (a child)(abduction: foreign custody 
              rights) [2007]1 All ER 783(HL) at [28] per Baroness Hale.   
87  See DL Mendis, “The Legislative Transformation of Treaties” (1992) 13 (3) Stat LR 216 at 224- 
225. 
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